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MANAGING THE REGULATORY STATE: THE
EXPERIENCE OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
John D. Graham∗
Paul R. Noe
Elizabeth L. Branch
The United States Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an
organization within the Executive Office of the President, seeks to promote
wise expenditures, regardless of whether those expenditures are
made through budgetary programs or through unfunded mandates on states
or the private sector. The lion’s share of these unfunded regulatory
mandates is aimed at businesses, but these rules also impact other entities
such as state and local governments, unions, colleges and universities, and
health care providers.1
One of the key roles of OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) is to review new rulemakings and stimulate modernization
of existing rules. 2 OIRA performs its regulatory oversight with a team of
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1. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (OMB), OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY
AFFAIRS, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND
TRIBAL ENTITIES, 137-81 (2005) [hereinafter OMB, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS].
2. OIRA’s authority to oversee new and existing regulations can be found in
Presidential Executive Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993), and the
Regulatory Right to Know Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-554, §624, 114 Stat. 2763.
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about thirty career OIRA analysts who apply a “soft” benefit-cost test. 3
OIRA asks whether the quantified benefits of a rule exceed the quantified
costs, but OIRA also strives to be sensitive to important “intangible”
considerations. These unquantified factors may reflect basic issues of
fairness, such as civil rights, or they may reflect a key efficiency concern
that cannot yet be fully measured and expressed in monetary units (e.g.,
homeland security). Considering both matters of efficiency and fairness,
OIRA analysts ask whether a rule has adequate supporting analysis and
whether the benefits of a rule justify its costs. 4
The distinction between budgetary rules and unfunded mandates is
important. 5 The new prescription drug benefit under Medicare was
authorized by legislation and implemented through rulemaking. 6 It is
considered a budgetary program, however, not an unfunded
mandate, because the expenditures are paid for by taxpayers through the
federal government’s Medicare appropriation. The Department of
Transportation’s Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program, the
goal of which is to save oil by boosting the fuel economy ratings of cars,
sport utility vehicles, vans and pick-up trucks, is an unfunded mandate.7
The costs of meeting these federal standards are not paid through the
federal appropriations process; they are presumably incurred by consumers,
investors and employees in the motor vehicle industry. This Article
focuses on unfunded mandates on the private sector.
The purpose of this Article is to explain how Presidential management
of federal regulation, through OMB oversight, has been carried out in the
first five years of the George W. Bush Administration, during the tenure of
Dr. John Graham as the Administrator of OIRA. Part I traces the history of
Presidential management of the regulatory state. Part II explores the

3. OIRA has an additional twenty career OIRA analysts who work on statistical and
information policy. These analysts also assist in regulatory reviews and reviews of
administrative (paperwork) burdens under the Paperwork Reduction Act.
4. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (“Each
agency . . . shall propose a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits
of the intended regulation justify its costs.”).
5. Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Congress recognized two types
of unfunded mandates: “federal intergovernmental mandates” and “federal private sector
mandates.” 2 U.S.C. §§ 658 (5), (7) (2000). The Act imposes special requirements on both
Congress and the executive branch before these unfunded mandates may be imposed. Id. §
1501.
6. See Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066; 70 Fed. Reg. 4193 (Jan. 28, 2005).
7. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902 (2006) (average fuel economy standards for passenger
automobiles); Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011,
71 Fed. Reg. 17,566 (Apr. 6, 2006).
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concept of “smart regulations,” and the associated emphasis on rigorous
benefit-cost analysis, that Dr. Graham implemented as OIRA
Administrator. Part III summarizes the various critiques that have been
offered against the “smart regulation” approach, and addresses those
arguments. Part IV explores future challenges in regulatory policy.
I.

PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT OF THE REGULATORY STATE

Every President from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush has embraced
centralized executive oversight of agency regulations. 8 Even critics of
OMB acknowledge the legitimacy of a centralized oversight function.9
8. See James Blumstein, Presidential Administration and Administrative Law:
Regulatory Review By the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy
Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851, 854-55 (2001) (“[C]entralized presidential
regulatory review has now taken center stage as an institutionalized part of the modern
American presidency.”). For a more detailed and skeptical account of the evolution of
centralized OMB oversight under Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan, see Robert V.
Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental
Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 128-55 (1991); see also Michael Herz,
Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 219
(1993) (with every President since Nixon, there have been “increasingly systematic efforts
to gain control of the federal bureaucracy”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2283 (2001) (examining the “presidentialization of administration—
the emergence of enhanced methods of presidential control over the regulatory state”);
William F. West, The Institutionalization of Regulatory Review: Organizational Stability
and Responsive Competence at OIRA, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 76, 76-78 (2005)
(“Modern Presidents have often found centralized forms of management to be appealing”
and regulatory review “is consistent with this thesis.”).
9. See Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way
to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1064 (1986) (acknowledging that OMB can
perform useful functions in coordinating disputes between agencies about rules and assuring
that relevant scientific and economic information is shared between agencies; that agencies
consider public comments submitted during the rulemaking process; and that agencies
consider whether a rule is necessary and lawful). Elena Kagan has argued that “statutory
delegation to an executive agency official . . . usually should be read as allowing the
President to assert directive authority . . . over the exercise of the delegated discretion.”
Kagan, supra note 8, at 2251. But see Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President
and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 118 (1994) (“The framers did not
constitutionalize presidential control over all that is now considered executive.”); Morrison,
supra, at 1059 (over the last decade, as OMB’s role in the issuance of regulations has
increased, questions have arisen as to the “legality and desirability of OMB’s role.”); Erik
Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management and Budget Supervision of
Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT.
RESOURCES L. 1, 12 (1984) [hereinafter Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power] (“OMB Review of
EPA rules raises constitutional, statutory, and policy concerns.”); Peter L. Strauss,
Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 984 (1997) (stating that the President
“disserves the democracy he leads when he behaves as if rulemakings were his
rulemakings”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Myth of the Unitary Executive, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
299, 299, 306 (1993) (stating that under the Constitution, the President does not have the
power “to tell an agency what to do,” but as a matter of policy, “there should be presidential
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Presidents have found regulatory oversight to be necessary and desirable
because: (i) the regulatory state is a permanent part of the legal landscape
of the United States; (ii) the economic costs of the regulatory state are
substantial; (iii) a consensus is needed when executive branch
disagreements about regulation arise; and (iv) federal regulations are often
necessary to achieve legislative objectives and implement Presidential
priorities and policy objectives. 10 Virtually all scholarship on this subject
acknowledges the increasing importance of OMB’s role in regulatory
policymaking over the past thirty years. 11
A.

President Nixon

President Nixon initiated efforts to centralize regulatory review in 1971
through his “Quality of Life” program. OMB established “a procedure for
improving the interagency coordination of proposed agency regulations,
standards, guidelines and similar materials pertaining to environmental
quality, consumer protection, and occupational and public health and
safety.” 12 The Quality of Life program focused on rulemakings that could
be expected to impact other agencies, impose significant costs or “negative
benefits” on non-Federal sectors or increase the demand for Federal

oversight of the regulatory process”).
10. For example, when Congress did not pass President George W. Bush’s Clear Skies
proposal, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) relied on its existing authority to
accomplish many of the same results though rulemaking. See Standards of Performance for
New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg.
28,606 (May 18, 2005); Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and
Ozone, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005).
11. See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1986) (“In the 1970s, growing dissatisfaction
with government regulation led to formal presidential oversight of executive branch
rulemaking.”); Herz, supra note 8, at 221-22 (starting with President Nixon, there were a
“series of presidential initiatives to seize control of the federal bureaucracy via OMB”);
Morrison, supra note 9, at 1059-63 (acknowledging and lamenting the growth of power of
OMB in regulatory decision making under Nixon, Ford, and Reagan). For a review of the
documentation of the history of OMB’s regulatory policy, see the web site of The Center for
Regulatory Effectiveness, http://www.thecre.com/ombpapers/centralrev.html.
12. The Quality of Life program had its genesis in a memorandum from OMB that was
first directed to EPA and then to the heads of all of the departments. See Memorandum
from George Shultz, OMB Director, to Heads of Departments and Agencies (Oct. 5, 1971),
available at http://www.thecre.com/ombpapers/QualityofLife1.htm [hereinafter Schultz
1971 Memorandum]. Critics of the Quality of Life review process complained that it
focused primarily, if not exclusively, on EPA rules. See Herz, supra note 8, at 221 (the
Quality of Life review was primarily focused on EPA rulemakings); Olson, supra note 9, at
9 (stating that the Quality of Life review was “nominally applicable to all health and safety
regulations, but in fact limited almost solely to review of EPA rules”).
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funding. 13 Agencies were required to provide an explanation of the
principle objectives of the rulemaking, the alternatives that were
considered, and a comparison of the expected benefits and the costs
associated with the alternatives. 14 OMB managed the interagency review
process by circulating the proposed rules, gathering comments from other
agencies, and arbitrating interagency disputes. The Nixon program served
as a foundation for later efforts to build a strong, coordinated system of
regulatory review within the executive branch.15
B.

President Ford

In 1974, building on President Nixon’s first steps, President Ford
established the Council on Wage and Price Stability (CWPS) and the
Review Group on Regulatory Reform to assess the inflationary aspects of
government actions. 16
In that same year, President Ford issued Executive Order 11,821
(Inflation Impact Statements) which required that “major” regulatory
proposals “be accompanied by a statement which certifies that the
inflationary impact of the proposal has been evaluated.” 17 OMB was
directed to develop criteria for identifying rules subject to the Executive
Order and in so doing to consider the following general categories of
significant impact:
a. cost impact on consumers, businesses, markets, or federal, state
or local government;
b. effect on productivity of wage earners, businesses or
government at any level;
c. effect on competition;
13. See Schultz 1971 Memorandum, supra note 12, at 1.
14. Id.
15. DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1075 (“Modest initial efforts [at formal
presidential oversight of executive branch rulemaking] begun during the Nixon
Administration have been strengthened and expanded by each president who followed.”).
16. See Murray Weidenbaum, Regulatory Process Reform, 21 REGULATION 20, 20
(1997).
17. See Exec. Order No. 11,949, 42 Fed. Reg. 1,017 (Jan. 5, 1977) (amending (and
extending) Executive Order 11,821 and changing the title to “Economic Impact
Statements”); Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (Nov. 27, 1974); see also
Christopher C. DeMuth, Constraining Regulatory Costs: The White House Review
Programs, 4 REGULATION 13 (1980) (“The first serious effort [at controlling regulatory
costs] was the Inflation (or Economic) Impact Statement program instituted by President
Ford early in his administration, which required the executive branch agencies to prepare
evaluations of the expected impact of all major new regulations upon prices, productivity,
and competition.”).
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d. effect on supplies of important products or services.18
While OMB had day-to-day responsibilities under the Executive Order,
its overall involvement was limited; the agencies were responsible for
ensuring their own compliance. 19 And while regulatory costs were to be
considered, stringent analysis was not required of agencies.
C.

President Carter

President Jimmy Carter, a former small businessman, surprised some
with his strong regulatory reform initiatives. 20 In 1978, President Carter
issued an executive order 21 that required agencies to conduct a regulatory
that would include the economic
analysis of significant rules 22
consequences of the various alternatives considered by the agency.23
Executive Order 12,044 stated that one of its purposes was to ensure that
regulations “shall not impose unnecessary burdens on the economy, on
individuals, on public or private organizations, or on State and local
governments.” 24 The Executive Order also directed the agencies to
conduct a periodic review of existing regulations to ensure that policy
objectives were being met.25 President Carter also established the
Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG), a cabinet-level entity
responsible for reviewing the regulatory analyses of a limited number 26 of
18. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. at 41,501.
19. Id. OMB’s review role was also limited because it occurred so late in the rulemaking
process. See Percival, supra note 8, at 139 (“[T]he Ford Administration shifted the focus of
regulatory review away from prepublication review toward review of proposed regulations
during the public comment period.”).
20. See JAMES L. GATTUSO, THE HERITAGE FOUND., REINING IN THE REGULATORS: HOW
DOES PRESIDENT BUSH MEASURE UP?, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY NO. 1801, at 4 (2004)
[hereinafter GATTUSO, REINING IN THE REGULATORS] (“[T]he Carter Administration spurred
more regulatory reform than any other Administration before or since” but “there was also a
substantial increase in the number of new costly regulations imposed by agencies.”);
Percival, supra note 8, at 142-43 (noting that President Carter surprised some
environmentalists by being a strong proponent of White House oversight of expensive EPA
regulations, and crediting the Carter Administration for creating “the most comprehensive
regulatory review program that had ever been established”).
21. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 24, 1978).
22. Significant rules included those that would result in “(a) an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more; or (b) a major increase in costs and prices for individual
industries, levels of government or geographic regions.” Id. at 12,663.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 12,664-65. The Regulatory Flexibility Act also requires such periodic review
of existing regulations that will have a significant economic impact upon a substantial
number of small entities. 5 U.S.C. § 610 (2000).
26. The Executive Committee of the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG)
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major regulations, and the new Regulatory Council, responsible for the
semi-annual Agenda of Regulations established in Executive Order
12,044. 27
Perhaps more importantly, 28 in the late 1980s President Carter signed the
Regulatory Flexibility Act 29 and the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA).30
The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to analyze and minimize
regulatory impacts on small businesses. The PRA, which effects agencies
intending to create additional paperwork, recordkeeping, or information
collection burdens on ten or more members of the public, also created
OIRA within OMB. 31 OIRA serves as the President’s office of regulatory
expertise and management, as well as overseer of paperwork burdens and
information policy.
D.

President Reagan

In his challenge to incumbent President Carter, Ronald Reagan ran on a
platform of “regulatory relief” for businesses, since the “misery index”
revealed serious economic problems: double-digit rates of unemployment,
inflation, and interest. 32 The U.S. economy was entering the worst
selected ten to twenty regulatory analyses annually for its review, with no more than four
from any one agency. See Memorandum from George Eads, Council of Economic Advisors
to the Regulatory Analysis Review Group, to participants (Oct. 17, 1979) available at
http://www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_CounEconAdvMemo101779.PDF. RARG was chaired
by the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA). Its Executive Committee was comprised of
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), OMB, and two rotating executive branch members,
one an economic member and one a regulatory member. The RARG Review Group
consisted of CEA, OMB, EPA, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the
Departments of Commerce, Labor, Treasury, Agriculture, Energy, Health Education and
Welfare, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, Transportation, and the Interior. The
Domestic Policy Staff and the Council on Environmental Quality served as advisors and
CWPS provided analytical staff support. RARG could decide to review a regulation for any
number of reasons, but the main reasons were: (i) large total cost; (ii) large sectoral impact;
(iii) deficient regulatory analysis; (iv) precedential importance; and/or (v) broad policy
issues. Id.
27. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. at 12,661.
28. See Percival, supra note 8, at 147 (noting that President Carter signed two laws that
dramatically increased the economic review of federal regulation, the Regulatory Flexibility
Act, which was aimed at protecting small businesses from unnecessary regulatory burdens,
and the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), which created OIRA).
29. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601 et seq (2006).
30. The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 was signed by President Carter on December
11, 1980 and took effect on April 1, 1981. See Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L.
96-511, 94 Stat. 2812.
31. Id.
32. See
1988
Republican
Party
Platform,
ALLPOLITICS.COM,
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/conventions/republican/features/platform.88
(defining the misery index during the Carter era).
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recession since the Great Depression. During his first days in office,
President Reagan appointed a new Task Force on Regulatory Relief chaired
During the Reagan
by Vice President George H.W. Bush. 33
Administration, with the assistance of the newly-created OIRA, the focus
shifted from agencies policing their own regulations to OMB review and
oversight. 34
On February 17, 1981, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12,291
which revoked Executive Order 12,044. 35 Executive Order 12,291 took
bold steps in the efforts to improve the quality of Federal regulations by
mandating how and why costs and benefits of regulatory actions 36 must be
considered. It provided that:
a. Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information
concerning the need for and consequences of proposed
government action;
b. Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential
benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs
to society;
c. Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net
benefits to society;
d. Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective,
the alternative involving the least net cost to society shall be
chosen; and
e. Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of

33. Blumstein, supra note 8, at 859 (“Because deregulation had been a centerpiece of
his campaign, President Regan was eager to begin the process.”); Percival, supra note 8, at
148 (on his first working day in office, President Reagan created a cabinet-level Task Force
on Regulatory Relief chaired by the Vice President).
34. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER REAGAN’S EXECUTIVE ORDER: THE
ROLE OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 75-81 (V. Kerry Smith ed., 1984) (examining how
Executive Order 12,291 “consolidated” OMB’s oversight powers); see also Olson, supra
note 9, at 5 (“A wide array of powers have made OMB an influential, new omnipresent
force within the executive branch.”); Percival, supra note 8, at 149-50 (President Reagan
centralized power in OMB to an “unprecedented degree” and “as a practical matter . . . gave
OMB enormous power to influence the substance of regulatory decisions.”).
35. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).
36. See MARLO LEWIS, JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM:
OPTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, ISSUE ANALYSIS NO. 3 (2005) (“President
Reagan elevated the role of economics in regulatory oversight.”); DeMuth & Ginsburg,
supra note 11, at 1075 (earlier regulatory review programs “directed agencies to assess the
social costs and benefits” of rules; President Reagan’s program directed agencies “to decide
regulatory questions according to the assessments of costs and benefits”) (emphasis in
original); West, supra note 8, at 80 (“Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291 required costbenefit analysis and centralized review for all (not just major) regulations.”).
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maximizing the aggregate net benefits to society 37
Under Executive Order 12,291, an agency had to prepare a Regulatory
Impact Analysis for every major rule. 38 OMB was authorized to designate
rules as “major” rules 39 and review the Regulatory Impact Analyses of the
major rules. 40 Agencies, however, were not permitted to publish these rules
in the Federal Register until OMB concluded its review. 41 The
Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief had oversight over OMB
actions under Executive Order 12,291. 42
Thus, President Reagan
consummated the move to centralize regulatory review and strengthened
the regulatory analysis requirements.
The creation of OIRA and President Reagan’s use of his power to curtail
regulation, however, caused conflict with Congress.43 Critics argued that
OMB was interfering with the authority of the agencies, working in
secrecy, and abusing its authority. 44 Advocates of strong worker,
consumer, and environmental protections were especially disturbed.45

37. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193.
38. Id. at 13,194. President Reagan’s regulatory review program expanded previous
efforts by requiring “White House review of virtually all rules.” DeMuth & Ginsburg,
supra note 11, at 1075.
39. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,196.
40. Id. at 13,194.
41. Id. at 13,195; see also Percival, supra note 8, at 149 (noting that this Executive
Order “purported to give OMB the authority to block publication of regulations for an
indefinite period of time while review was pending”).
42. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193.
43. Blumstein, supra note 8, at 860 (“But there are often costs to such a striking success,
and that was the case with the ultimate implementation of the [E]xecutive [O]rder
[12,291].”).
44. See DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1085-86:
The private nature of the regulatory review process has been both a strength and a
weakness. It has been a strength because, like any other deliberative process, it
can flourish only if the agency head or his delegate, and OMB as the president’s
delegate, are free to discuss frankly the merits of the regulatory proposal. . . . The
necessity to proceed privately has been a weakness only because it has put OMB
at a disadvantage in responding to allegations that it does, or at least could, act as
a ‘conduit’ for information or influence to be introduced illicitly into the agency’s
decision calculus. These concerns are, however, misplaced.
See also Morrison, supra note 9, at 1064 (expressing concern that OMB under Reagan
operated in an “atmosphere of secrecy and insulation from public debate”); Morrison, supra
note 9, at 1070-71 (stating that changes made by OMB during regulatory review have made
rules more difficult to defend in court); Olson, supra note 9, at 55 (“OMB long has been
criticized for the secrecy with which it operates.”); Strauss, supra note 9, at 983 (stating that
viewing the President, rather than Congress, as “rulemaker” is “disturbing”).
45. See Morrison, supra note 9, at 1065 (expressing concern that OMB review delays
issuance of vital health and safety rules while placing interests of industry over public health
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Numerous reforms of OIRA were proposed. 46 In response to these
concerns, the Reagan Administration agreed to two key OIRA reforms:
Senate confirmation of the OIRA Administrator, 47 and certain public
disclosures. To that end, OIRA Administrator Wendy Gramm issued a
memorandum outlining disclosure procedures for, among other things,
communications between OIRA and the public, and for certain drafts,
documents, and correspondence exchanged with the agency. 48 Toward the
end of the Reagan Administration, the first Senate-confirmed OIRA
Administrator, S. Jay Plager, assumed the leadership of OIRA. 49

and safety); Percival, supra note 8, at 186-87 (raising concerns that OMB review under
Reagan was concerned only with costs, and not with benefits).
46. See Morrison, supra note 9, at 1071-73 (providing that Congress should prevent
OMB intervention in regulatory matters by amending the Administrative Procedure Act or
through an appropriations rider; the President should amend the Executive Order to limit
OMB review to a few major rules each year and to make OMB’s function advisory only;
OMB should have staff in sufficient numbers with appropriate expertise; OMB
communications on rulemakings should be publicized; OMB should not be permitted to
interfere with agency discretion; regulatory review authority should be placed in an office
separate from the one that determines agency budgets; and OMB, not the agency head,
should have to elevate its regulatory policy concerns to the President); Olson, supra note 9,
at 74-79 (providing that courts should ensure that OMB does not usurp the agency’s
discretion and should require the docketing of OMB contacts with the agency about
rulemakings; Congress should establish a regulatory review board supervised by the
President but outside of OMB and statutorily clarify that OMB-agency comments should be
docketed); Percival, supra note 8, at 203 (noting that there are options for “preventing OMB
from displacing EPA’s exercise of decision-making authority”; namely, restructuring EPA
as an independent agency, although it may not be a desirable method of improving agency
accountability; restructuring regulatory review to restore the primacy of the agency’s role in
rulemaking; permitting the public to monitor the review process through increased
disclosures; and transferring OIRA oversight authority to the CEA).
47. Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat.
1783-335.
48. Memorandum from Wendy L. Gramm, OIRA Administrator, to Heads of Dept’s and
Agencies Subject to Executive Order Nos. 12,291 and 12,498 on Additional Procedures
Concerning OIRA Reviews Under Executive Order Nos. 12,291 and 12,498 [Revised] (June
13, 1986) [hereinafter Gramm Memorandum], reprinted in U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT APRIL 1, 1992—
MARCH 31, 1993, at 585 (1993) [hereinafter OMB, 1993 REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE
UNITED STATES]. The Gramm Memorandum built on an earlier memorandum from Robert
Bedell, the Deputy Administrator of OIRA, outlining OIRA procedures with respect to
record maintenance, public access to records, and meetings with the public. Memorandum
of Robert P. Bedell, Deputy Administrator of OIRA, to OIRA Staff on OIRA Procedures
(May 30, 1985), reprinted in OMB, 1993 REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra, at 594-97.
49. The OIRA Administrators prior to Mr. Plager (July 1988 to Nov. 1989) were James
Miller (Jan. 1981 to Oct. 1981), Christopher DeMuth (Oct. 1981 to Aug. 1984), Douglas
Ginsburg (Aug. 1984 to Sept. 1985), and Wendy Gramm (Oct. 1985 to Feb. 1988).
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President George H. W. Bush

President George H.W. Bush did not have an OIRA Administrator to
oversee the regulatory process. The President nominated Professor James
Blumstein of Vanderbilt Law School to serve in this capacity, but his
nomination was not considered on the Senate floor due to controversy over
reauthorization of the Paperwork Reduction Act, despite his being an
accomplished regulatory scholar. 50 Professor Blumstein’s nomination was
reported out of Committee with approval.51
Early in his Administration, as an analogue to the Task Force on
Regulatory Relief, President George H. W. Bush created a new structure in
the Executive Office of the President to serve a similar function—the
Council on Competitiveness (the Council) run by Vice President Dan
Quayle. 52 The Council assisted OMB with the regulatory review program
under Executive Order 12,291. 53 Under President George H.W. Bush, the
Council and OMB exercised oversight over a number of major
rulemakings. 54 During his tenure, President Bush also signed several
statutes which resulted in a large increase in regulatory burden—for
example, the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990. 55

50. See Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances:
The Case of Presidential Review and Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 167 (1995) (noting
that OMB review of regulations “got caught in a crossfire” over the reauthorization of the
Paperwork Reduction Act”). The nomination was not allowed to come to the Senate for a
vote. See 136 CONG. REC. 36,321 (1990); Blumstein, supra note 8, at 860-61.
51. 136 CONG. REC. 36,320 (1990).
52. Percival, supra note 8, at 155 (the Quayle Council on Competitiveness was modeled
after President Reagan’s Regulatory Relief Task Force).
53. LEWIS, supra note 36, at 25; Shane, supra note 50, at 168 (“OIRA lacked an adviceand-consent appointee to wield its authority over executive agencies,” so “the Council on
Competitiveness stepped in to fill the political void.”).
54. Herz, supra note 8, at 225 (noting that critics of the Council, including
Representative Henry Waxman, were concerned that the Council was weakening health,
safety, and environmental regulations, and charged that the Council was “an illegal shadow
government.”). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, rejected challenges to both
President Bush’s Council on Competitiveness and President Reagan’s Presidential Task
Force on Regulatory Relief. See Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(holding that President Reagan’s Task Force is not subject to the Freedom of Information
Act); New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (rejecting a challenge to an
EPA rule based on the argument that EPA acted improperly in relying on the opinion of the
Council on Competitiveness, finding instead that EPA “exercised its expertise”).
55. GATTUSO, REINING IN THE REGULATORS, supra note 20, at 4 (stating that President
George H. W. Bush’s deregulatory efforts “were overshadowed” by “huge regulatory
programs” under the Clean Air Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act); LEWIS, supra
note 36, at 25 (stating that in part because the Council on Competitiveness did not have the
resources to review many rules, and in part because President George H. W. Bush signed the
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President Clinton

President Clinton appointed Sally Katzen, a Washington attorney, and
former Chair of the American Bar Association’s Section on Administrative
Law and Regulatory Practice, to serve as OIRA Administrator. 56 On
September 30, 1993, President Clinton rescinded Executive Order 12,291
(implemented under Presidents Reagan and Bush) and issued Executive
Order 12,866 to take its place. 57 Under Executive Order 12,866, OMB
remained the central reviewer of agency regulations 58 and, while the Order
highlighted non-quantifiable effects such as “distributional impact,”
“equity,” and “qualitative measures,” the importance of a cost-benefit
analysis was reaffirmed. 59 Executive Order 12,866 reduced the scope of
rules subject to interagency review, from all rules under Executive Order
12,291 (approximately 2,000 each year) to “significant” regulatory
actions 60 (approximately 500 to 600 each year). Further, for each
“significant” regulatory action, as determined by OMB, the agency was
required to assess both the costs and benefits of the proposed regulatory
action as well as those of the alternatives that were considered but not
selected. 61 The Executive Order also “restored” the primacy of agency
authority over regulatory decisions,62 reaffirmed the public disclosure

Clean Air Act and Americans with Disabilities Act, the total number of pages in the Federal
Register “shot up”).
56. Toward the end of the Clinton Administration, Ms. Katzen (June 1993 to Jan. 1998)
moved to serve in the White House, and John Spotila (July 1999 to Dec. 2000) became the
OIRA Administrator.
57. Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,735.
58. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,735. The order provides: “The
Administrator of OIRA shall provide meaningful guidance and oversight so that each
agency’s regulatory actions are consistent with applicable law, the President’s priorities, and
the principles set forth in this Executive Order and do not conflict with the policies or
actions of another agency.” Id.
59. The Order provides that, “in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches,
agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits.” Id. It further provides
that “[e]ach agency shall assess both the costs and benefits of the intended regulation and,
recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a
regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation
justify its costs.” Id.
60. A “significant” regulatory action is one that is likely to result in a rule that may have
an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; create a serious inconsistency, or
otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; materially alter the
budgetary impact of entitlements, among other things; or raise novel legal or policy issues
arising out of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or the principles set forth in the
Executive Order. Id.
61. Id. at 51,737.
62. Id. at 51,735; see Shane, supra note 50, at 174 (noting that the Clinton Executive
Order is “more deferential to policy making by individual agencies”).
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procedures established by the Gramm Memorandum, 63 and added a new
requirement that OIRA disclose the fact that an agency has formally
submitted a draft rule to OIRA for review. 64 Whether the full strength of
the Executive Order was implemented under President Clinton has been
debated. 65 In any event, the Administration of President George W. Bush
has found it to be workable, as discussed below. 66
II. OIRA’S “SMART REGULATION” APPROACH DURING THE GEORGE
W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION
A.

Philosophy

During the Administration of George W. Bush, OIRA embraced a
“smart regulation” approach that was neither pro- nor anti-regulation.
Under this approach, OIRA evaluated the merits of each rulemaking on a
case-by-case basis using insights from economics, science, engineering,
and law. Scholars have argued the merits of such a technocractic approach

63. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg at 51,737; Gramm Memorandum, supra
note 48.
64. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg at 51737. By requiring the contemporaneous
disclosure of the fact that a draft rule has been formally submitted for OIRA review, Exec.
Order No. 12,866 waived the deliberative process privilege that protects such a disclosure.
See Wolfe v. Department of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 768, 773-76 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (“Congress adopted Exemption 5 [to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(5) (2006)] because it recognized that the quality of administrative decision-making
would be seriously undermined if agencies were forced to operate in a fishbowl.”).
65. JAMES L. GATTUSO, THE HERITAGE FOUND., REGULATING THE REGULATORS: OIRA’S
COMEBACK EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM NO. 813 (May 9, 2002) [hereinafter GATTUSO,
REGULATING THE REGULATORS] (“During the eight years of the Clinton Administration,
OIRA rarely blocked, or even slowed, proposed regulations.”); GATTUSO, REINING IN THE
REGULATORS, supra note 20, at 4 (Under President Clinton, “limiting regulatory burdens
was—for the first time in two decades—not made a priority.”); Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr.,
Promise and Peril: Implementing a Regulatory Budget, 31 POL’Y SCI. 343, 348 (1998)
[hereinafter Crews, Promise and Peril] (“The aggressive Office of Management and Budget
regulatory review function maintained by Presidents Reagan and Bush has been scaled back
by President Clinton.”).
66. For a view that a new, stronger Executive Order is needed, see Robert W. Hahn &
Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and
Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1494-97 (2002) (proposing eight
innovations over previous Executive Orders, including promoting agency compliance with
Executive Orders; prompting regulation; considering substitute risks and abstaining from
regulating trivial problems; explaining rationales for action when benefits do not exceed
costs; making underlying analyses available; formulating an annual regulatory retrospective
and regulatory plan, including independent agencies; and authorizing judicial review of
documents generated as a result of the order) [hereinafter Hahn & Sunstein, A New
Executive Order].
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to regulation. 67
OIRA’s “smart regulation” agenda embraces technical and scientific
expertise. The President selected one of the authors of this article, Dr. John
Graham, who had been a faculty member at the Harvard School of Public
Health for over seventeen years, to serve as OIRA Administrator. 68 Dr.
Graham taught benefit-cost analysis at Harvard where he also created and
led the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis. Disproving concerns raised
during his confirmation process, 69 under Dr. Graham, OIRA moved toward
case-by-case assessments, grounded in sound science and benefit-cost
analysis, with a focus on the well-being of society as a whole.
B.

The Evolution of OIRA under Administrator Graham

What did OIRA and the agencies do during Administrator Graham’s
tenure to improve the performance of federal regulators? OIRA made
progress without doing anything fancy. OIRA did not seek, nor did it
receive, any new authority from Congress to reform regulations. OIRA
simply implemented the requirements of President Clinton’s 1993
executive order on regulatory planning and review 70 and two statutes
67. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 55-81 (1993) (suggesting a change in administrative review to address the
problems of risk regulation); RISK, COSTS AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS
FROM REGULATION 104-34 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996) (“Benefit-cost analysis can be an
extraordinarily valuable tool for policy analysis but it must be reformed.”); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 99-132 (2002) (stating
that the government should “assess the magnitude of risks”; “examine all the effects of risk
reduction, including costs and additional hazards created by risk reduction itself”; and
“explore alternatives to any proposed action”); Robert W. Hahn & Rohit Malik, Is
Regulation Good For You?, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 893, 905-07 (2004) [hereinafter
Hahn & Malik, Is Regulation Good for You?] (suggesting ways for OMB to improve the
economic analyses provided by agencies in support of their regulations); John Morrall,
Saving Lives: A Review of the Record, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 221, 229 (2003) (“The
range of cost-effectiveness among rules continues to be enormous.”); Richard H. Pildes &
Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 72 (1995)
(embracing cost-benefit analysis as playing “a useful role in policy analysis” but arguing
that its inherent flaws warrant modification).
68. Dr. Graham was confirmed by the Senate on a vote of sixty-one to thirty-seven after
a spirited debate about the proper role of benefit-cost analysis in regulatory policy. 147
CONG. REC. S7938 (daily ed. July 19, 2001) (U.S. Senate Roll Call votes). Dr. Graham
served as OIRA Administrator from July 2001 to January 2006.
69. See Nomination of John D. Graham as Administrator of the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs at the Office of Management and Budget: Hearing Before the Senate
Committee On Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001).
70. President Bush amended Executive Order 12,866 with Executive Order 13,258, 67
Fed. Reg. 9385 (Feb. 28, 2002). One of the changes was to shift the responsibility for
resolving conflicts between agencies, or between an agency and OMB, from the Vice
President to the Chief of Staff. Id. at 9386.
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passed by Congress during the Clinton years: the Regulatory Right to
Know Act 71 and the Information Quality Act. 72
OIRA, under Administrator Graham, has done six things: (1) it has
worked openly; (2) it has buttressed its staffing in science and engineering;
(3) it has raised the analytic expectations of regulators; (4) it has developed
a serious, government-wide information quality agenda; (5) it has taken a
more proactive role in the development and modernization of rules; and (6)
it has formed strong partnerships with the President’s Council of Economic
Advisors, Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Council on
Environmental Quality, as well as with the Small Business
Administration’s Office of Advocacy and the Department of Commerce.
i.

Step 1: OIRA does its work openly 73

Executive Order 12,866 made the regulatory review process “more
accessible and open to the public” by codifying disclosure procedures.74
Pursuant to these procedures, when OIRA meets with people who have
concerns about a rulemaking, these meetings are documented and updated
daily on OMB’s web site, including basic data on the rule being discussed,
71. See Regulatory Right to Know Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 624, 114 Stat.
2763. The Regulatory Right to Know Act directs OMB to quantify annually the costs and
benefits of federal regulations and prepare a report to Congress on the results of the analysis.
72. Information Quality Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515 app. C, 114 Stat.
2763A-153. The Information Quality Act amends the Paperwork Reduction Act, and
attempts to increase the quality and accuracy of information disseminated by the federal
government.
73. For a review of how OIRA has become more transparent since 2001, see U.S.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, STIMULATING
SMARTER REGULATION: 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES, 11-13
(2002) [hereinafter OMB, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS]; GEN. ACCN’G OFFICE (GAO),
OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE
REVIEWS 52-58 (2003) [hereinafter GAO, 2003 REGULATORY REVIEW REPORT] (the General
Accounting Office was renamed the Government Accountability Office in 2004). Some
critics argue that OIRA’s transparency is insufficient and that OIRA should disclose all
drafts and communications exchanged by OIRA and the agencies prior to formal submission
of the rulemaking package. See Curtis Copeland, Remarks at the Fordham Urban Law
Journal Symposium on the Contemporary Regulatory State (Feb. 23, 2006). Transparency,
however, must be balanced with the deliberative process necessary to open and frank
communications within the Executive Branch. See DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 11, at
1086 (“The administration’s deliberative process would be significantly compromised if the
preliminary rounds in any such disagreement [between an agency and OMB] were routinely
publicized.” Further, “there are no statutory prohibitions of ex parte contacts by agencies
engaged in informal rulemaking” and “criticism focusing on ex parte contacts by OMB
misses the point because communications that remain secret cannot determine the outcome
of the regulatory process.”).
74. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,735.
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and the names and affiliations of the participants. 75 OIRA invites the
affected agencies to join these meetings but does not disclose minutes of
these discussions so that the participants can speak candidly. OIRA does
disclose any written materials distributed at these meetings.
This “climate of openness” has helped demystify OIRA’s work, reduced
concerns previously raised by Congress and reporters during the initial
years of the formal regulatory review process under Executive Order
12,291, and freed OIRA’s analysts to do their work instead of responding
to critics’ process concerns. While controversy about regulatory policy in
Washington will always exist, the debate now relates more to substance
than process.
ii.

Step 2: OIRA buttressed its staffing in science and engineering

Historically, OIRA staff had strong backgrounds in economics, statistics,
and policy analysis.76 The nature of federal regulation, however, has
changed since OIRA was created in 1981. Most classic economic
regulation has been rescinded or is produced by independent agencies
which are not subject to OIRA regulatory oversight. The fastest area of
growth has been public health, safety, and environmental regulation,
sometimes referred to as science-based or social regulation. To respond to
this trend, OIRA hired highly trained experts in fields such as
environmental science, engineering, epidemiology, toxicology, public
health, and health policy. Although the small number of new employees at
OIRA may seem modest, OIRA’s ability to ask tough questions of
regulators—and engage in technical dialogue with agency specialists—has
increased substantially.

75. See OIRA Communications With Outside Parties, http://whitehouse.gov/omb/oira/
(last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
76. Critics of OIRA have sometimes claimed that OIRA lacks needed technical and
scientific expertise. See Morrison, supra note 9, at 1065-66 (expressing concern that OMB
staff are asking technical questions, even though “virtually all of its reviewing staff are
economists, lawyers, or public policy analysts, not scientists, pharmacologists, or doctors”
and “lack the substantive backgrounds to make intelligent judgments”); Olson, supra note 9,
at 14 (“While OMB oversight is intended to increase the objectivity and rationality of
decisionmaking, the opposite effect may result due to the Office’s lack of staff and
inadequate technical expertise.”); Percival, supra note 8, at 181-82 (raising concerns that
OIRA’s career staff lack scientific and technical expertise on regulatory matters). In
countering such criticisms, it has been asserted that “OMB staff is routinely able to ask hard
questions, both substantive and methodological, to which an agency should be expected to
have good answers before it proceeds to regulate. . . . The OMB staff is more expert than the
agencies in one field—the field of regulation itself.” DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 11, at
1083-84. Further, OIRA’s recent hires address these criticisms.
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iii. Step 3: OIRA raised its analytic expectations of agencies
OIRA began in 2001 by reviving the “return letter.” 77 Between July and
December of 2001, OIRA issued over twenty return letters to agencies,
suggesting that specific rulemaking proposals need to be reconsidered. 78
This rate of return, while modest compared to the hundreds of rules
reviewed, was more than the total number of return letters in eight years of
the Clinton Administration. 79 Four years later, OIRA rarely needs to issue
a return letter. Agencies work with OIRA to fix problems or they persuade
OIRA that there is no problem to fix.
In an admittedly obscure but readable document called OMB Circular A4, OIRA has described—in less than fifty pages—what it expects to see in
a regulatory analysis. 80 This guidance document was developed through an
open process that included public comment, expert peer review, and formal
interagency
review.
The
changes in
Circular
A-4
were
important refinements, not a revolution.
Circular A-4 prescribes that lifesaving gains from rules are valued in the
range of $1 million to $10 million per statistical life saved; OMB does not
pretend to have a more precise answer. 81 In other ways, however, the A-4
guidance is more prescriptive. Rules projected to have billion-dollar
impacts must be accompanied by formal, probabilistic uncertainty analysis
to help clarify when rulemaking decisions should be made promptly, and
when delay can be justified by improved data and information. 82 Health
and safety rules also must be accompanied by cost-effectiveness analysis
that accounts for reductions in both mortality and morbidity. 83 OIRA
worked with federal agencies and the Institute of Medicine to define
common measures of effectiveness, such as the quality-adjusted life year,

77. During the course of OIRA’s review of a draft regulation, the Administrator may
decide to send a letter to the agency that returns the rule for reconsideration. Such a return
may occur if the quality of the agency’s analyses are inadequate, if the regulatory standards
adopted are not justified by the analyses, if the rule is not consistent with the regulatory
principles stated in Executive Order 12,866 or with the President’s policies and priorities, or
if the rule is not compatible with other Executive Orders or statutes. See U.S. OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET (OMB), OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, MAKING SENSE OF
REGULATION: 2001 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES, 41 (2001) [hereinafter
OMB, 2001 REPORT TO CONGRESS].
78. OMB, 2001 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 77, at 41.
79. During the last three years of the Clinton Administration, no return letters were
issued. Id. at 39-43.
80. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, CIRCULAR A-4 (2003).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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that all health and safety agencies can use.84
The air office at EPA has done some work in this area that is
promising. Even before the requirements of A-4 took effect, EPA prepared
a formal probability analysis in support of a new rule that cuts by ninety
percent the diesel exhaust from off-road engines. This rule will impose
several billion dollars per year in compliance costs on refineries and engine
suppliers, but the probability analysis shows that the agency is more than
ninety percent certain that the benefits of this rule will exceed the
costs. 85 Formal confidence measurement helps both the agency and the
public.
iv.

Step 4: OIRA has developed an “Information-Quality” agenda

OIRA recognized that the results of regulatory analysis—and policy
making generally—are only as good as the quality of the input information.
OIRA did not sanction a process of “garbage in, garbage out,” but instead
shined a spotlight on information quality (IQ). OIRA’s new IQ policy
requires that agencies: (i) develop minimum information-quality standards,
(ii) utilize peer review prior to the release of official scientific information,
and (iii) provide a new opportunity for the public to correct information
that has been disseminated in error.86 The IQ process is still a work in
progress, but there already exist examples of its potential. 87

84. The Institute of Medicine (IOM), at the request of OMB and several federal agency
sponsors, developed guidance on conducting cost-effective analyses for regulations. INST.
OF MED., VALUING HEALTH FOR REGULATORY COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS (2006),
available at http://www.iom.edu/CMS/3809/19739/32029.aspx.
85. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (EPA), OFFICE OF TRANSP. & AIR QUALITY, FINAL
REGULATORY ANALYSIS: CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM NONROAD DIESEL ENGINES (2004),
available at http://www.epa.gov/nonroad-diesel/2004fr/420r04007.pdf.
86. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
INFORMATION
QUALITY
GUIDELINES
(2002),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/iqg_oct2002.pdf; Memorandum from Dir. Joshua
B. Bolten to Heads of Dep’ts and Agencies, Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer
Review
(Dec.
16,
2004),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2005/m05-03.pdf.
87. For a critique of the implementation of the Information Quality Act, see THOMAS O.
MCGARITY ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, TRUTH AND SCIENCE BETRAYED:
THE CASE AGAINST THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT, PUBLICATION NO. 502, at 1 (March
2005) (“Disgruntled industries have used the [Information Quality] Act as an end run
around well-established procedures for promulgating rules to improve air quality, clean up
toxic waste sites, and protect children and wildlife from pesticide residues.”); Lisa
Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration
Part I, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,297, 10,302 (2004) [hereinafter, A Perfect Storm, Part I]
(expressing concerns that industries can delay regulation by filing challenges to science
under the Information Quality Act). For a response to these criticisms, see OMB, 2005
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 64-66 (noting that agencies have not been
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v. Step 5: OIRA has taken a more proactive role
Throughout most of the period of formalized regulatory review under
Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,866, OIRA review occurred at the end of
the process, after the rulemaking agency had devoted considerable time and
resources in developing the draft rule. This end-of-the-pipe function allows
OIRA to have substantial impact with limited resources, but can also result
in an unfortunate loss of agency time and effort if problems are not
diagnosed until late in the decision-making process. Moreover, focusing
only on the fire “du jour” can neglect systemic problems.
Early involvement is about getting it right the first time. This is a
simple, common sense idea, but it can have profound implications. In the
face of world-wide competition, the American business community
implemented this concept, and revitalized itself. In the 1980s, this was
called “Total Quality Management.” It was based on the work of W.
Edwards Deming, a former U.S. government statistician who brought a
commitment to quality to post-war Japan, and similar concepts can be
applied to the regulatory review process. 88
Under the Bush Administration, OIRA has grappled with this problem
by using different labels such as performance-based management, or
managing for results. OIRA tried to think outside of the old paradigm of
weeding out bad quality at the end of the line, and instead focusing on
building good quality into the system from the start. Deming emphasized
that quality must be built into the production process, not just inspected for
at the end; it was the management system, not employees, that was the
problem. 89 Through a series of process reforms detailed below, OIRA
worked to build quality into the regulatory process, rather than just inspect
it afterward. 90
Under Dr. Graham, OIRA invented a new tool called the “prompt”
letter—a public letter to an agency suggesting that it should consider

overwhelmed with correction requests; the Information Quality Act has been utilized by all
sectors, not just industry; and OMB is not aware of any evidence that the Information
Qulaity Act has slowed the regulatory process or chilled agency disseminations).
88. See E. Donald Elliott, TQMing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive
Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 177-79 (1994) (noting that to be effective, quality control must be
utilized in the early stages, not at the end of the process).
89. Id.
90. For a criticism of early OMB involvement in EPA rulemakings, see Olson, supra
note 9, at 47 (“Early OMB involvement compromises EPA’s role as the front-line expert
decisionmakers in matters entrusted to EPA by Congress.”).
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adopting a new regulation. 91 OIRA has issued roughly a dozen such
letters, the first one resulting in a new Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) labeling requirement for foods. 92 The food label must now contain
data on the trans-fat content of foods as well as the saturated fat content. 93
FDA projects that this rule will produce benefits in heart-disease
prevention that will pay for the costs of the rule 100-fold. This rulemaking
was initiated in the Clinton Administration, and finished by FDA at
OIRA’s request.
Another notable success with the early involvement strategy was an EPA
rule on emission from nonroad diesel engines. OIRA and the Office of
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration collaborated with EPA as
it developed a final rule on nonroad diesel engines. 94 By requiring
dramatic reductions in the sulfur content of fuel, plus new control
equipment on engines, this rule will cut the diesel exhaust from off-road
engines used in mining, agriculture, construction, and other off-road
applications by ninety percent. As a result of the panel process provided
for in the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA), 95 smaller horsepower engines were exempted from some of the

91. For
more
information
on
prompt
letters,
see
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt_letter.html. For skeptical views of the
prompt letter, see DAVID M. DRIESEN, CTR. FOR PROGESSIVE REG., IS COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS NEUTRAL? AN ANALYSIS OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S APPROACH TO
ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH AND SAFETY PROTECTION, WHITE PAPER NO. 507, at 13 (2005)
[hereinafter DRIESEN, IS COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?] (“[N]one of the letters sent to
agencies protecting safety, public health and the environment urged them to adopt new
regulations not already underway at the agencies or required by statute. Nor do the letters
prompt agencies to adopt more stringent requirements than they were already likely to adopt
on their own.”); Karen R. Harned & Elizabeth A. Gaudio, OMB Prompt Letters: Are They
Promoting (Smarter) Regulation?, 6 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 9-11
(2005) (arguing that prompt letters have “done little to promote agency priority setting” and
that OIRA should focus its resources on reducing the regulatory burden on small
businesses). For a favorable view of prompt letters, see Hahn & Sunstein, A New Executive
Order, supra note 66, at 1494 (stating that prompt letters ensure that cost-benefit analysis
will be used “not simply to reduce and limit regulation, but also to spur regulation in those
cases where it will do more good than harm.”).
92. See Letter from John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, to Hon. Tommy G.
Thompson, Secretary, Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/hhs_prompt_letter.html.
93. Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims,
and Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,434-01 (July 11, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.
101).
94. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA and OMB Working to Speed the Reduction
of Pollution From Nonroad Diesel Engines (June 7, 2002), available at
http://whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/r-117.pdf.
95. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612, was amended by the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA). SBREFA

GRAHAM_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

MANAGING THE REGULATORY STATE

2/3/2011 10:23 PM

121

control requirements and small equipment manufacturers received
flexibility provisions in the final rule. EPA took a giant step forward in
improving air quality ($78 billion in net benefits per year when fully
implemented), but did so without jeopardizing the welfare of small
equipment manufacturers.96
Through prompt letters and other proactive mechanisms, OIRA and
federal agencies have worked together to save more lives in a cost-effective
manner. 97
OMB has also undertaken efforts to reform the sea of existing rules.
Since OMB began to keep records in 1981, federal agencies published
118,375 new rules in the Federal Register. 98 Through 2005, a total of
20,928 of these rules were considered important enough for OMB review,
and 1,164 were classified as “major” rules costing over $100 million
annually, and required to be supported by a regulatory impact analysis.99
The vast majority of these rules have never been re-examined to
determine whether they achieved their intended purpose, or what their
actual costs and benefits were. 100
Responding to a statutory requirement to develop “recommendations for
reform,” 101 OIRA launched a public-nomination process in 2001 and 2002
to identify about 100 rules that agencies are now reforming. 102 In 2004,
OIRA launched a more targeted effort to streamline rules impacting the
manufacturing sector of the U.S. economy; about seventy-six such rules
have been targeted by agencies for reform. 103
As important as these reviews are, they should be compared to a more
straightforward approach that was recently used by the Department of

requires that an agency convene a review panel prior to issuing the initial regulatory
flexibility analysis of a regulation, if required. 5 U.S.C. § 609(b).
96. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69
Fed. Reg. 38,958 (June 29, 2004).
97. Morrall, supra note 67, at 233.
98. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DRAFT 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 26 (2006).
99. Id.
100. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2000). Section 610 of the
RFA requires the agencies to review periodically (and within ten years of the publication of
the final rule) those rules issued by the agency which have or will have a significant
economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities.
101. Regulatory Right to Know Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 624, 114 Stat. 2763.
102. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
PROGRESS IN REGULATORY REFORM: 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND
TRIBAL ENTITIES 150-210 (2004) [hereinafter OMB, 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS].
103. OMB, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 117-25.
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Transportation (DOT) to discard old rules. 104 Since large airlines once
owned the computerized reservation companies, DOT had adopted
complex rules to protect consumers from deceptive ticketing
information. 105 DOT concluded last year that it was no longer necessary to
regulate the information provided to consumers of airline tickets.106 The
computerized reservation companies are now rarely owned by airlines, and
the Internet has advanced to a point that consumers no longer need
government assistance to purchase airline tickets. Importantly, the majority
of the Computer Reservation System (CRS) rules could be efficiently
discarded in large measure because of an unusual feature of the original
rule: a “sunset” provision calling for removal of the regulation unless the
agency decided affirmatively to retain it.
vi.

Step 6: OIRA formed strong partnerships within the federal
government

OIRA has strengthened its expertise in the review process through strong
partnerships with several entities within and outside of the Executive
Office of the President. The Council of Economic Advisors bolsters
OIRA’s economic expertise. 107 The Office of Science and Technology
Policy contributes greatly to discussions involving scientific research and
analysis. 108 The Council of Environmental Quality provides support for
review of environmental regulations.109 The Office of Advocacy within
the Small Business Administration provides input on small business
concerns, thereby ensuring that a community greatly impacted by the
substantial cost of regulations has a strong voice. 110 The Department of
Commerce provides valuable data and analyses. With the support of these
partnerships, OIRA is able to review regulations more efficiently and
effectively.

104. Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 976 (Jan. 7, 2004).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. For more information on the Council of Economic Advisors, see
http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/about.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
108. See http://www.ostp.gov.
109. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq.
110. See generally U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY (2005),
available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/sb_econ2005.pdf (annual report to the
President regarding small businesses’ performance in the economy); see also Exec. Order
13,272, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,461 (Aug. 16, 2002) (providing the Office of Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration a formal role in reviewing regulatory analyses).
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Results of “Smarter Regulation”

Although improving the federal regulatory process has value in its own
right, it is also important to track how changes in process influence the
flow of rulemakings and the resulting benefits and costs. OIRA has
assembled summary information on federal rules each year since 1981 (the
year OIRA was created) that satisfy the following criteria: the rule was
issued by a Cabinet agency or EPA and was projected to have an annual
economic impact of $100 million per year or more on the private sector or
state and local governments. These criteria exclude (1) “budgetary rules”
where federal appropriations pay for all or much of the rulemaking
costs; and (2) rulemakings by “independent” agencies, such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), that occur without OIRA oversight. In the discussion
that follows, we refer to rulemakings meeting these criteria as “major
rules.” Major rulemakings, which can be of a regulatory or deregulatory
character, are the primary focus of OIRA’s regulatory oversight activities.
i.

Volume of Major Rules, 1981 - 2004

During the 1981-2004 period, 234 major rules were issued by federal
agencies, predominantly the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Department of Transportation, the Department of Labor, the Department of
Health and Human Services, the Department of Energy, the Department of
Agriculture, and the new Department of Homeland Security. The volume
of major-rule activity was not uniform throughout the period. The number
of major rulemakings for each administration was: President Reagan (first
term)—eighteen; President Reagan (second term)—twenty-four; President
George H. W. Bush—fifty; President Clinton (first term)—thirty-nine;
President Clinton (second term)—sixty-six; and President George W. Bush
(first term and beginning of second term)—thirty-seven. 111
The $100 million-impact test has not been adjusted for inflation since it
was established in 1981. 112 As a result, one would have expected that
the measured volume of major-rule activity would have increased over this
period, even if the actual volume of regulatory activity was unchanged,
111. These statistics were compiled from final rules (or regulatory impact analyses that
were publicly available as part of agency rulemaking dockets) having societal costs and/or
benefits in excess of $100 million that were published in the Federal Register from 1981 to
September 2005. As this article was written at the beginning of his second term, the figure
for President George W. Bush covers only forty-four months.
112. The Consumer Price Index increased 108 percent from 1981 to 2004, from 90.9
to 188.9. See THE ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 279, tbl.B-60 (2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/erpcover2005.pdf.
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since, as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) grew, more and more
rulemakings would exceed the $100 million threshold. Thus, this portrayal
of rulemakings by year tends to overstate the volume of regulatory activity
in the recent years relative to the early years.113
While it is interesting to group the major-rule counts by Administration,
the differences in the counts between Administrations cannot be attributed
exclusively to factors under a President’s control. A major rule proposed in
one Administration may not be finalized until the next Administration.
Major rules that are mandated by Congress, especially those with statutory
deadlines or court-ordered deadlines, are not fully within the discretion of
an Administration. Even for mandatory rulemakings, Congress often gives
the President significant leeway in how the rule will be crafted. Despite
these qualifications, the major-rule counts are a rough indicator of
rulemaking activity. Moreover, since most rulemakings add restrictions
rather than remove them, the major rule counts are a rough indicator of the
flow of new restrictions on the private sector and state and local
governments.
The number of major rules issued is not a performance indicator. Major
rules vary enormously in their projected costs and benefits. Although
economic efficiency is not the only factor relevant to assessing
governmental performance, it is useful to track how the projected benefits
and costs of major rules have changed over time.
D.

Projected Costs of Major Rulemakings, 1981-2004

From 1981 to 2004, 234 major rules were issued by Cabinet agencies
and EPA. 114 Based on the agencies’ regulatory impact analyses, the
projected cost of each of these rules was identified and expressed in
constant 2001 dollars. The sum of these 234 annualized cost estimates is
$117 billion per year, accounting for new regulatory costs as well as any
reductions in regulatory burdens due to deregulation. 115 Thus, $117
billion is an estimate of how much the flow of new rulemakings has added
to annual regulatory burden in the United States over the last quarter
century. 116 This figure, however, does not account for the burdens of the
stock of existing rules, or rules issued by the “independent” agencies such
as the SEC and the NRC. The costs of non-major rules, rules issued by

113. In 2005 dollars, a $100 million threshold would pick up rules worth $48 million in
1981 dollars.
114. See OMB, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 37, fig. 2-1.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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independent agencies, and rules adopted prior to 1981, are not known with
any precision. In fact, estimates of the costs of the entire stock of existing
federal rules range from several hundred billion dollars per year to more
than a trillion dollars per year. 117 Even these large figures exclude the
costs of state and local regulatory actions, some of which may be
stimulated by federal laws and policies.
The flow of new regulatory costs has not been uniform across
Administrations. During President Reagan’s first term, when “regulatory
relief” was pursued with determination, the burdens of new rules were
actually less than the burdens removed by deregulatory activity, resulting in
an average net change in regulatory costs of -$0.2 billion per year for the
1981-1984 period. 118 Major-rule costs, however, climbed substantially
during President Reagan’s second term (1985 - 1988) to an average of
more than $5.2 billion per year—including a surprising $8 billion annually
averaged over his last two years. 119 During President George H.W. Bush’s
administration (1989-1993), major-rule costs continued to climb to $8.5
billion per year while comparable figures for President Clinton’s first term
(1993-1996) and second term (1997-2000) were $5.7 billion per year and
$8.5 billion per year, respectively. 120 For the first forty-four months of
President George W. Bush’s tenure, the major-rule costs averaged $1.7
billion per year, or about sixty-eight percent lower than the annual average
for the previous twenty years. 121
E.

Projected Benefits and Costs of Major Rulemakings, 1981-2004

OIRA is still collecting the fragments of agency information on the
projected benefits of major rules for 1981 to 1991, a period when benefit
estimation was in its infancy, especially for rules related to public health,
safety, and environmental policy. OIRA has assembled what is known
about agency benefit projections for major rules issued from 1992 to 2004,

117. See W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS 4 (2005)
(estimating that the cost of federal regulations totals $1.1 trillion).
118. See OMB, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 37, fig.2-1.
119. Id.
120. Most of the costs incurred during President Clinton’s second term were due to a
flood of rules issued in the last year of his Administration, many just prior to the Florida
recount in late 2000.
121. The major factor in the cost figure for 2001 was the repeal of OSHA’s ergonomics
rule on November 14, 2000. After the final rule was issued, Congress passed Senate Joint
Resolution No. 6 to overturn the rule under the Congressional Review Act, and it was
signed into law by President George W. Bush in March of 2001. The enactment of Senate
Joint Resolution No. 6 was estimated to result in a $4.8 billion cost savings in 2001. Pub. L.
No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001).
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a subsample of 111 rules where agencies projected both benefits and
costs. 122
The good news is that, during this period, the average annual benefits of
major rules, estimated at $19.1 billion, exceeded the average annual costs
of major rules, estimated at $5.6 billion. These figures account for both the
number of major rules and the benefits and costs of those rules.
The overall rate of net benefits from major rules was significantly larger
under President George W. Bush than in the 1990s. 123
A different performance indicator is the average benefit and average cost
of a major rule. During the thirteen-year period from 1992 to 2004, the
average annualized benefit of a major rule was $2.24 billion, a significantly
larger amount than the average annualized cost of a major rule, which was
$0.48 billion per year. For the first forty-four months of the George W.
Bush Administration, the average benefit to cost ratio for major rules was
about thirteen, significantly larger than the average benefit-to-cost ratio for
major rules during the previous nine years, which was approximately
five. 124
In assessing the meaning of these figures, it is important to keep several
caveats in mind. First, many of these rules have unquantified benefits and
unquantified costs. The figures only account for projected rulemaking
consequences that the agency was able to express in monetary units.
Second, the figures are computed relative to a “do nothing” or “baseline”
policy alternative, which creates a fairly easy benefit-cost test for the major
rule. A more difficult test would be a comparison of the adopted rule to
the “next best” regulatory alternative, which is typically not to “do
nothing” or adopt a simple “baseline” assumption. Agencies, however,
may be reluctant to report analytic results for “next-best” alternatives out of
a concern that such results may be used by opponents to argue against the
agency’s preferred rulemaking action. Third, even when benefits exceed
costs, net benefits are not necessarily maximized, which is a goal of
Executive Order 12,866.
F.

Are Projected Benefit and Cost Estimates Accurate?

The figures presented above are based on ex ante projections of
regulatory costs and benefits, which means that the projections were made

122. See OMB, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 38.
123. Id.
124. The figures were calculated using figure 2-2 from OMB, 2005 REPORT
CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 38.
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by agency analysts before the rule was issued and implemented. 125 It
would be very useful to know whether ex ante projections are accurate.
Unfortunately, the number of rules that have been analyzed retrospectively,
using ex post data, is quite small. In fact, the “validation” literature on
regulatory benefit-cost analysis amounts to a series of case studies.
In 2005, OIRA assembled forty-seven case studies of EPA, the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), the National
Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) and NRC
rules where validation information had been published by academic
specialists, agencies, or think tanks. 126 OIRA found that sometimes the
estimates were accurate (+/- 25%), sometimes they were too large, and
sometimes they were too small. More frequently, however, both regulatory
costs and benefits were overestimated, although the errors tend to be
more frequent on the benefit side than the cost side of the ledger. It is not
clear whether the extent of these errors are large enough to call into
question the regulatory alternatives selected by agencies; nor is it clear how
many of these errors should have been diagnosed and corrected ex ante. 127
Although the forty-seven cases are the largest database ever assembled
on the accuracy issue, it is not known whether the findings from these
forty-seven cases are representative (i.e., the forty-seven cases are a
convenience sample drawn from the available literature). More systematic
research is needed to determine whether the estimates of projected costs
and benefits published by federal agencies are accurate.
III. RESPONDING TO COMMENTARY ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
It is now well accepted that benefit-cost analysis is playing a growing
role in federal regulatory policy, 128 both in the United States and around
the world. 129 Professor Cass Sunstein of the University of Chicago has
summarized this trend as the rise of the “Cost-Benefit State.” 130
The growing influence of benefit-cost analysis in federal regulatory
125. Id. at 41.
126. Id. at 41-43.
127. Id.
128. See Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1415
(2003) (stating that “cost-benefit analysis is a fait accompli”) (emphasis added).
129. See OMB, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 73, at 64-69 (providing
information on regulatory governance documents in other developed countries).
130. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF
REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002). But see Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50
ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 12 (1998) (“I am skeptical about Professor Sunstein’s cost-benefit
state.”).
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policy has stimulated concerns among scholars and activists. Some
commentators argue that benefit-cost analysis has a systematic probusiness bias that will lead to insufficient federal regulation, particularly
in fields of public health, safety, and environmental policy. 131 There are at
least two strands to this argument: one concerns alleged flaws or biases in
the analytic tool; 132 the other concerns the way in which OMB employs its
various authorities to oversee the federal regulatory agencies.133
Other commentators argue that federal agencies can too easily “fudge
the figures” (e.g., exaggerate benefits and low-ball costs), resulting
in continued expansion of federal regulation and a corresponding intrusion

131. See WILLIAM BUZBEE ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, REGULATORY
UNDERKILL: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S INSIDIOUS DISMANTLING OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS, 1 (2004) [hereinafter BUZBEE ET AL., REGULATORY
UNDERKILL] (noting that “regulated corporations have made determined and concerted
efforts to use their wealth and political power to diminish or even eliminate various health,
environment, and safety protections”); DRIESEN, IS COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?,
supra note 91, at 4 (stating that cost-benefit analysis “enjoys strong support from regulated
industry and the think tanks it funds”); DAVID M. DRIESEN, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE
REGULATION, THE FEASIBILITY PRINCIPLE, WHITE PAPER NO. 407, at 2 (Dec. 2004)
[hereinafter DRIESEN, FEASIBILITY] (noting that cost-benefit analysis permits companies to
“kill and injure people if it would ‘cost too much to refrain’”); LISA HEINZERLING & FRANK
ACKERMAN, GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW & POL’Y INST., PRICING THE PRICELESS: COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 4 (2002) [hereinafter HEINZERLING &
ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS] (“[T]he case for cost-benefit analysis of environmental
protection is, at best, wildly optimistic and, at worst, demonstrably wrong.”); THOMAS O.
MCGARITY ET AL., SOPHISTICATED SABOTAGE: THE INTELLECTUAL GAMES USED TO SUBVERT
RESPONSIBLE REGULATION 197-216 (2004); Parker, supra note at 128, at 1368 (stating that
“ex ante predictions likely understate net benefits in many cases”); Frank Ackerman et al.,
Applying Cost-Benefit Analysis to Past Decisions: Was Environmental Protection Ever a
Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 155, 192 (2005) (“A rigid insistence on making regulations
pass cost-benefit tests would, in retrospect, have gotten the wrong answer time after time.”);
Herz, supra note 8, at 229 (“Regulatory review has always flourished in the context of
environmental regulation.”).
132. See DRIESEN, FEASIBILITY, supra note 131, at 14 (endorsing the feasibility principle
as a “rational alternative” to cost-benefit analysis); EILEEN GAUNA ET AL., CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER NO. 505, at 18 (2005)
(“Agencies should embrace a precautionary approach to dealing with risky activities.”); Lisa
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2063-64 (1984)
(noting that “fixation on quantified benefits to human health either assumes, as a normative
matter, that benefits that cannot be counted do not count, or assumes, as a factual matter,
that benefits that cannot be counted are not very big”)
133. See CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, A NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR PUBLIC
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A PROJECT OF THE CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION,
WHITE PAPER NO. 501, at 6 (Jan. 2005) (providing that agencies should not be subject to
“overbearing supervision by the White House at the behest of regulated entities”); Morrison,
supra note 9, at 1067 (stating that it is “one thing for OMB to play the role of institutional
skeptic” and “another for it to second-guess technical decisions” made by career personnel,
Cabinet officers or agency heads); Olson, supra note 9, at 14 (“OMB review politicizes
technical issues, if only because of the office’s admitted anti-regulatory bias.”).
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into personal freedom, privacy, and free enterprise. 134 They argue that
alternative regulatory checks and balances are needed.135 We address these
concerns, with the benefit of almost five years of practical
experience implementing a vigorous OIRA oversight program.
Some commentators, who see the growth of federal regulation as a
problem per se, 136 believe that analytical requirements (e.g., benefit-cost
tests on new rules) enforced through OIRA review (and/or judicial review)
are not an adequate solution. They point to the fact that the federal
regulatory establishment, measured by the number of agency employees,
the number of new rules, and the estimated size of regulatory burdens, has
grown steadily since 1981, despite the creation of a centralized office of
regulatory oversight within the Executive Office of the President. 137 They
also argue that OIRA’s oversight staff is too small and powerless relative to
the vast federal regulatory bureaucracy. 138 They also emphasize that the
independent federal regulatory agencies operate outside of OIRA
oversight. 139 These commentators argue for a variety of more fundamental
134. See LEWIS, supra note 36, at 16 (“Agencies have an obvious incentive to downplay
the costs and exaggerate the benefits of the programs they administer.”); Crews, Promise
and Peril, supra note 65, at 346 (“Agencies inevitably believe that all of their regulations
confer net benefits.”); Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Regulatory Spending Escalation, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2002, at A15 (noting that cost-benefit analysis of rules by agencies is a form
of “self-policing”).
135. CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., REGULATORY REFORM PROJECT, JUMP, JIVE AN’ REFORM
REGULATION: HOW WASHINGTON CAN TAKE A SWING AT REGULATORY REFORM 4-21 (2000)
(suggesting various reforms of the regulatory system including Congressional approval of
all agency rules before they are binding on the public) [hereinafter CREWS, JUMP JIVE].
136. See ROBERT W. HAHN, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDS.,
REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (2000) (“During the past two
decades, the developed countries have witnessed an unparalleled rise in new regulations
related to the environment, health, and safety.”); GATTUSO, REINING IN THE REGULATORS,
supra note 20, at 2 (stating that “all rules come at a cost: a ‘regulatory tax’ imposed on all
Americans”); LEWIS, supra note 36, at 12 (“The costs of federal regulation are large,
growing, and, what is more disturbing, uncontrolled.”); Crews, Regulatory Spending
Escalation, supra note 134 at A15 (“Estimated costs of meeting the demands of off-budget
regulations hit $854 billion in 2001.”).
137. See GATTUSO, REINING IN THE REGULATORS, supra note 20, at 3 (stating that
“regulation has been growing in size and scope for decades”); LEWIS, supra note 36, at 8
(stating that “the cost of regulation may be much greater than official estimates suggest.”);
MURRAY WEIDENBAUM, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF AMER. BUS., PROGRESS IN FEDERAL
REGULATORY POLICY, 1980-2000, CONTEMPORARY ISSUE SERIES NO. 100, at 7 (2000)
(stating that in the mid-1980s, “[a]ggregate regulatory costs resumed their upward climb”).
138. See GATTUSO, REGULATING THE REGULATORS, supra note 65, at 2 (“regulators have
outmanned OIRA’s approximately 50 staffers by some 2,500 to one, making effective
oversight difficult.”); LEWIS, supra note 36, at 17 (“Although agencies routinely claim high
benefit-cost ratios for their rules, OMB does not—and due to resource restraints cannot—
validate such claims.”).
139. See GATTUSO, REINING IN THE REGULATORS, supra note 20, at 13 (stating that
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institutional reforms to reduce the size of the federal regulatory state:
greater congressional accountability for new regulations, 140 automatic
sunset provisions for existing rules, 141 and enactment of an annual
regulatory budget for unfunded mandates on the private sector and state
and local governments. 142 Insofar as OIRA is to be responsible for
stimulating the quality of agency-conducted regulatory analysis, some
commentators contend that OIRA should focus on accurate accounting of
regulatory costs and dispense with the speculative task of estimating
regulatory benefits, 143 since agencies can simply fudge the benefit figures
to make a case for the rules that they desire. 144 We assess briefly below the
views of these commentators.
The current structure of OIRA oversight, because it is aimed only at
“significant” new rules, is not designed to restrain the total number of rules
issued by the federal government. Each year, only approximately 600 145
out of approximately 8,000 146 new rulemakings are judged by OIRA and
federal agencies to be significant enough to justify formal OIRA review.
As long as OIRA is not reviewing most new rules, it is not reasonable to
independent agencies should be subjected to the OIRA review process or “at least be
required to prepare cost-benefit analyses of all planned significant rules and to forward the
analyses to OIRA for non-binding review”); LEWIS, supra note 36, at 53 (“Given the
potentially devastating impacts of ill-designed economic rules . . . a strong case can be
made for extending OMB review to independent agency rulemakings.”).
140. See CREWS, JUMP JIVE, supra note 135, at 4 (stating that there is a “compelling” case
for sending rules to Congress for approval); LEWIS, supra note 36, at 8 (“Congress should
have to approve economically significant rules before they go into effect.”); Crews,
Regulatory Spending Escalation, supra note 134 at A15 (“If Congress were to vote on
agency rules (in an expedited fashion) before they are binding, it would fulfill citizens’ right
to ‘No regulations without representation.’”); Crews, Promise and Peril, supra note 65, at
364 (“[A]gency regulations should be turned into bills requiring passage by Houses of
Congress and a Presidential signature.”).
141. CREWS, JUMP JIVE, supra note 135, at 20-21 (stating that Congress should consider
sunsetting existing regulations).
142. See LEWIS, supra note 36, at 72 (“Under a regulatory budget, agencies would be
required, in advance of proposing rules, to meet a particular statutory objective, to obtain
authority from Congress to spend private sector resources via regulation.”); WEIDENBAUM,
supra note 137, at 2 (“Each congressional committee ought to be required to present
estimates of the likely benefits and costs of regulatory actions necessary to implement
proposed legislation.”).
143. CREWS, JUMP JIVE, supra note 135, at 9-11 (stating that, in order to stop the
controversy over agency consideration of benefits, agencies “should concentrate solely on
assessing and fully presenting the costs of their initiatives—much as the federal budget
focuses only on the amount of taxes, not the benefits of dollars spent”).
144. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
145. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY MATTERS: REGULATORY REVIEW:
LISTS AND STATISTICS, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regpol.html#rr.
146. The number 8,000 is derived from a count of all documents (including both
proposed and final rules) in the Rulemaking section of the FEDERAL REGISTER.
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expect that OIRA review will result in fewer rules being issued by
agencies.
In the Reagan years, under Executive Order 12,291, agencies submitted
all new rules to OIRA for review. However, this system proved to
be impractical since most rulemakings are of minor importance and did not
justify centralized review by the Executive Office of the President. As a
practical matter, most minor rules were not subjected to rigorous review,
even in the Reagan years. When President Clinton designed Executive
Order 12,866, with the explicit focus on OMB review of significant rules,
he formalized a development that was already occurring on a more ad hoc
basis during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush years.
The “smart-regulation” philosophy implemented by Dr. Graham during
his tenure as OIRA Administrator is based on the premise that each
rulemaking proposal should be reviewed on its merits, accounting for the
benefits and costs of the proposal compared to the regulatory and nonregulatory policies already in place. According to this philosophy,
regulatory burdens are not necessarily inappropriate if they can be justified
by a valid benefits analysis, including a consideration of regulatory
alternatives that might accomplish the same degree of benefit at lower cost
to society.
Some commentators point out that “independent” regulatory agencies
operate outside OMB oversight yet are responsible for a large volume of
rulemaking that can be quite costly. 147 Scholars continue to question
the legitimacy of the independent regulatory agency. 148 As a practical
matter, however, the rulemakings of independent agencies are subject only
to Congressional (and judicial) supervision because that has been the
preference of the Congress.
Some have suggested requiring that the Congress vote to approve each

147. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 663 (1984) (“The power to balance
competing goals—and the concomitant power to influence at least to some degree the
agencies’ exercise of discretion—can only be the President’s. . . . This outcome does not
vary with whether the agencies are denominated independent.”); ABA COMM’N ON LAW
AND THE ECON., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION, SUPPORT FOR
LIMITED PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY OVER MAJOR REGULATORY DECISIONS 6 (1999):P
While it may be that some agencies or issues should remain free of presidential
review, it is urged that the exemptions be kept to a minimum. No clear or
principled decision underlines the current distinctions between ‘independent’
agencies, executive branch agencies, and ‘independent agencies within the
executive branch.’ Agencies of all kinds consider basic economic and social
policy decisions that elected officials can and should be capable of addressing.
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federal rule before it goes into effect. 149 The current disapproval
mechanism in the Congressional Review Act, which enables congressional
disapproval of rulemakings through expedited legislative procedures,
places the burden on Congress to act against new rules. 150 Some
commentators would like to see a reversal of the presumption so that new
rules do not take effect unless Congress takes affirmative action—by
enacting a law—to approve them. While these commentators can point to
the rare use of the expedited CRA procedures, it is not clear whether a
requirement for active legislative approval of each new rule would
really impact the number of new rules that take effect.
Some also make the argument that OIRA should abandon the effort to
improve agency analysis of regulatory benefits and instead focus primarily
or exclusively on improved measurement of regulatory costs. 151 With
more accurate cost figures, they argue, an annual cap on regulatory
“expenditures” (i.e., unfunded mandates on the private sector and state and
local governments) could be imposed on each regulatory agency, much like
the annual appropriations limits that agencies face for “on-budget”
expenditures. 152 Under this argument, the task of OIRA would then
become an accounting exercise of making sure that new rules proposed by
an agency do not have total annual costs that exceed the “budget” that has
been allocated (by Congress and/or OIRA) to that agency.
Although we believe that the idea of a formal “regulatory budget” has
promise (but would need to be subject to pilot projects and evaluation), the
effort to improve the quality of benefits analysis at federal agencies would
still need to continue. Presumably, programs with strong benefit
justification should receive more generous treatment under a regulatory
budget than programs without a strong benefit justification. Without
information on benefits, however uncertain, there is no analytic basis for
determining how large a regulatory “budget” or appropriation should be.
In short, the interest in “regulatory budget” reform should accentuate the
need for valid benefit measurement as well as cost measurement.
Some commentators are concerned that the emphasis on benefit-cost
analysis in regulatory policy creates a pro-business bias in health, safety,

149. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
150. Under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (2006), before a rule
can take effect, the agency must submit a brief report on the rule to each House of Congress.
5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A). Congress can utilize expedited procedures to adopt a joint
resolution of disapproval to disapprove the rule. 5 U.S.C. § 802.
151. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.

GRAHAM_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

MANAGING THE REGULATORY STATE

2/3/2011 10:23 PM

133

and environmental rulemakings. 153 This bias, they argue, arises because
the costs associated with the federal regulation of business tend to be
overestimated, while many of the benefits of public health, safety, and
environmental regulation are difficult to quantify or are simply intangible
in nature. 154 They allege further that OIRA oversight of the rulemaking
process is tilted too much toward finding cases of overregulation and not
enough to finding cases of underregulation. 155 Finally, echoing technical
concerns made decades ago, these commentators argue that there are
technical flaws in benefit-cost analysis (e.g., the ways that lifesaving is
valued in monetary units and the ways that future benefits are discounted to
present value) that work against needed protective regulations. 156 Instead
of emphasizing better benefit-cost analysis, these commentators argue for
greater emphasis on “the precautionary principle” and “feasibility” in
regulatory decision making. 157
The technical concerns voiced in recent law review articles and book
publications are not new. They do not differ significantly from similar

153. See DRIESEN, IS COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?, supra note 92, at 17 (With
cost-benefit analysis, OMB “has effectively created an additional hurdle that government
officials must jump through to create enforceable standards protecting health, safety, and the
environment. It has created a formidable presumption against the many rules that product
non-quantifiable benefits.”); HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS, supra
note 131, at 27 (“[I]n practice, cost-benefit analysis tends to skew decision-making against
protecting public health and the environment.”); MCGARITY ET AL., SOPHISTICATED
SABOTAGE, supra note 131, at 197-216.
154. See DRIESEN, FEASIBILITY, supra note 131, at 9-10 (“For many important health and
environmental effects, quantification [of benefits] is simply impossible” and so cost-benefit
analysis can result in agency paralysis.); BUZBEE ET AL., supra note 131, at 4 (stating that
industry “has a strong incentive to overstate the costs of regulation” and is “far more
difficult to generate the benefits side of the regulatory equation.”).
155. DRIESEN, IS COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?, supra note 91, at 2 (“OMB has
used [cost-benefit analysis] as a one-way ratchet that moves in a single direction if it moves
at all, frequently weakening agency proposals, but never strengthening them.”).
156. See id. at 4 (“Data gaps usually make quantitative risk assessment impossible or
very difficult.”); HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS, supra note 131, at 22
(stating that “discounting ignores the possibility of catastrophic and irreversible harm”);
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, supra note 132, at 2055-56
(questioning “whether the future benefits of health and environmental regulation should be
discounted at all, and, if so, at what rate”); Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The
Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory Movement, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 648, 657 (2002)
(“Discounting . . . systematically downgrades the importance of actions taken to prevent
long-latency diseases and long-term ecological harm.”); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
941, 948 (1999) (stating that the regulatory process should have “a more thoughtful
valuation of human lives threatened by environmental carcinogens” and should not use
“OMB’s deeply flawed technique of taking valuations from the workplace setting and
reducing them by an inflated discount rate”).
157. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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concerns that were raised in the 1970s and 1980s and addressed by
proponents of benefit-cost analysis of regulation. 158 Rather than review
this thirty-year literature and debate, we focus here on some technical and
institutional developments that are relevant to these concerns.
i.

Validity of benefit and cost figures.

While some commentators point to specific cases where the costs of
rules were overstated and/or the benefits of rules understated,159 there is
very little systematic study of the validity of pre-regulation estimates, based
on real-world information from the post-regulation period. The limited
literature that does exist was recently reviewed by OMB in its final 2005
Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation. 160
This literature reveals that all types of errors in estimation occur, with no
clear indication of policy bias against regulation. 161 If anything, the
anecdotal studies now available suggest that the benefit-cost ratios of new
rules were more likely to have been overstated than understated by agency
analysts, when real-world data are examined after a rule has been applied.
ii.

Cost measurement

Some commentators allege that the costs of federal regulation are
overstated by agency analysts who are compelled to rely uncritically on
biased information submitted by regulated entities.162 Moreover, they
argue, the pre-regulation estimates of costs prepared by agency analysts do
158. Nicholas A. Ashford, Alternatives to Cost-Benefit Analysis in Regulatory Decisions,
363 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 129 (1981) (criticizing cost-benefit analysis as a flawed
decision-making tool).
159. Thomas McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety and
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2042 (2002) [hereinafter, McGarity &
Ruttenberg, Counting the Costs] (“Numerous other studies support the general conclusion
that ex ante cost estimates tend to be much higher than real-world compliance costs.”). But
see ROBERT W. HAHN, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDS., IN DEFENSE
OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REGULATION 59 (2005) [hereinafter HAHN, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF REGULATION] (“The solution to legitimate concerns [about quantitative costbenefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis] raised by the critics is not to eliminate the
quantitative analysis, but to gain a deeper understanding of its strengths and weaknesses,
and to use it wisely.”).
160. OMB, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 41-52.
161. Id.
162. HEIZERLING & ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS, supra note 131, at 28 (stating
that cost estimates are “usually provided by the regulated industries themselves, which have
an obvious incentive to offer high estimates of costs as a way of warding off new regulatory
requirements”); McGarity & Ruttenberg, Counting the Costs, supra note 159, at 1998 (“In
preparing regulatory impact assessments for proposed rules, agencies are heavily dependent
upon the regulated entities for information about compliance costs.”).
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not account for the learning, innovation, and economies of scale that are
accomplished by businesses after a regulation is adopted and implemented.
Unlike other commentators, who fear that agency cost (and benefit)
estimates are manipulated to make rules look artificially good, 163 these
commentators fear that the analyses tend to inflate costs and thereby
portray good rules in an unfavorable light. 164
If agencies use state-of-the-art tools when estimating regulatory costs,
they can minimize the potential for bias in cost estimation. One technique
is to request confidential cost information from individual companies in a
regulated industry, both aggregate compliance cost information for a rule
and itemized cost estimates for particular technologies and compliance
practices. By comparing the confidential information supplied by different
regulated companies, agencies can identify estimates that appear to be
outliers on the high side or low side. Another technique is to request
confidential cost information from suppliers to regulated firms as well as
from the regulated entities themselves. The incentives of suppliers may be
different from regulated firms, since the supplier (e.g., a producer or
distributor of pollution-control equipment) may benefit from a regulatory
alternative that is burdensome to the regulated entity. Comparing cost
estimates provided by suppliers and regulated firms is another useful way
to identify outlier estimates.
In cases where a technology is already sold in the marketplace, the
observed market price of the technology may be a useful surrogate for the
marginal cost of production. Where the market price is likely to be an
inaccurate estimate of producer cost (e.g., due to monopoly or externalities
in the production process), the analyst can commission a “tear-down” study
that constructs the cost of the technology from its original inputs,
including the costs of both materials and labor. Analysts often find that
the marginal costs of producing a new technology decline as producers
learn about potential cost-saving measures and employ cost-saving
innovations in the production process. Marginal costs may also decline as
a producer achieves the economies of scale associated with mass
production. Some agency analysts are already employing pre-regulation
adjustment factors that reduce estimated regulatory costs based on
projections of learning, innovation and economies of scale.
Given the various tools of cost estimation available to the agency
analyst, it is feasible to estimate accurately the compliance costs associated
with new technologies, usually with a margin of error that does not exceed

163. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
164. Id..
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a factor of two.
iii. The discount rate
For many health, safety, and environmental regulations, the costs of a
rule are projected to occur before, sometimes years (or even decades)
before, its benefits. The largest cost items associated with expensive
federal rules are typically one-time capital costs associated with new
technology, costs that can be considered investments in health, safety, and
environmental improvement that may occur over the life of the new
technology (or even further into the future). A longstanding technical issue
in benefit-cost analysis concerns how benefits and costs that occur at
different points in time should be compared. Some commentators are
concerned that the discounting procedure used by economists is biased
against health, safety, and environmental protection. 165
The accepted technical solutions are to either (1) convert the stream of
future benefits into present value, using an appropriate discount rate,
thereby allowing proper comparison of benefits to capital and operating
costs, or (2) annualize the capital costs over the life of the
investment, using an appropriate interest rate, to facilitate comparison of
costs to benefits (which presumably can be expressed as a smooth annual
benefit stream). The difference between a present value and a
smooth stream of payments is familiar to the mortgage purchaser, who
faces a total mortgage and an annualized (or monthly) payment over the
life of the mortgage, computed using an interest rate. It can be shown that
the two procedures lead to identical rankings of policy alternatives based
on net benefits (benefits minus costs). Consequently, the choice of
computational procedure is really a matter of convenience and clarity of
presentation. Note that the second procedure entails annualization—and
enlargement—of costs, without any discounting of future benefits, while
the first procedure adjusts future benefits downward as aggregation occurs,
without adjusting costs.
The rationale for discounting needs to be considered because some
commentators allege that the discounting procedure biases regulatory
analysis against health, safety, and environmental protection. In particular,
they are disturbed about the powerful mathematical impact of the discount
rate on future benefits from many health, safety, and environmental
regulations. 166

165. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
166. HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS, supra note 131, at 21 (stating
that “discounting looks like a fancy justification for foisting our problems off onto the
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There are two economic arguments for giving more weight to an
immediate cost (or benefit) than a future benefit or cost (of the same
inflation-adjusted dollar value).167 One is based on investment theory,
while the other reflects consumption theory. Investment theory states that
any immediate cost represents a foregone investment opportunity. 168 If the
immediate cost is deferred, the resulting savings can be invested at a
positive rate of return that is defined by the expected inflation-adjusted
(“real”) rate of interest in the economy. (The inflation-adjusted rate of
interest is also the real discount rate used by analysts when transforming a
future cost or benefit into present value). Consumption theory posits that
consumers generally prefer gratification from a good sooner rather than
later. 169 Even public opinion surveys framed in a societal context suggest
that people would prefer that lives be saved sooner rather than later.
Implicitly, investment theory also relies on consumption theory, since the
ultimate value of returns on investment is greater consumption (and
consumer satisfaction) in the future.
Some commentators insist that the arguments for discounting may apply
to money but do not necessarily apply to health protection.170 There are
two responses. First, the investment rationale for discounting can be used
to annualize the one-time costs of rules, without making any assumption
that saving lives in the future is less valuable than saving lives today. 171
Thus, the first accepted technical solution (described above) does not
depend on a policy judgment that the intrinsic value of saving lives
declines over time. Second, insofar as money and health are fungible in
everyday life and both contribute to the welfare of consumers, then
whatever time preference is observed in monetary transactions involving
consumption is also, at the margin, applicable to consumer valuation of
health gains. 172
There is considerable debate about what numeric rate of discount should

people who came after us.”).
167
J. Lipscomb et al., Time Preference, in COST EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE
214-46 (Marthe R. Gold et al., eds. 1996).
168
169

See id. at 216-19.
Id.

170. See supra notes 151 and 160 and accompanying text.
171. W. KIP VISCUSI, DISCOUNTING HEALTH EFFECTS FOR MEDICAL DECISIONS IN
VALUING HEALTH CARE 133 (Frank A. Sloan ed., 1996) (providing a numeric example
demonstrating how discounting future lives saved is equivalent to accounting for the
opportunity cost of capital).
172. W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK
34-50 (1992) (presenting evidence of the value of life from labor market case studies).
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be used in regulatory analysis, 173 but there is a strong technical consensus
that the same numeric rate of discount should be applied to both benefits
and costs. The following paradox results from applying a smaller annual
rate of discount to benefits than to costs: delaying an investment that saves
lives in the future will always be desirable if the analyst is permitted to
assign a smaller discount rate to future benefits than to costs.
The most recent OMB guidance on selecting a discount rate for use in
regulatory analysis has three prongs. 174 First, it instructs agency analysts to
present analytic results based on real discount rates of three and seven
percent, the former justified when the costs of the rule are likely to be
incurred in the form of higher prices for consumer products (i.e.,
consumption losses) and the latter justified when the costs of the rule are
likely to be incurred in the form of displaced private investment (e.g., loss
of returns on investment). 175 Second, three and seven percent can be
supplemented by another rate when a strong technical case is made in the
context of a specific rulemaking. 176 Finally, when intergenerational
impacts of a rule are important, the guidance authorizes presentation of
results with a rate lower than three percent, since there is significant
technical debate about what the intergenerational discount rate should
be. 177 The new OMB policy is considerably different than the policy in
place during the Clinton Administration, which gave primary emphasis to
analytic results using a seven percent real rate of discount,178 although EPA
guidelines have given credence to three percent since the 1990s.
iv.

Unquantified benefits

Some commentators are concerned that benefit-cost analyses are biased
against health, safety, and environmental regulations because the
benefits seem to be less quantifiable than the costs.179 Conceptually, there

173. See HAHN, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REGULATION, supra note 159, at 7; DISCOUNTING
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 6 (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999)
(presenting a volume of papers that all assume that benefits and costs should be discounted
at some positive rate but vary in opinion about the appropriate rate).
174
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 80.

AND

175

Id.
Id.
177
Id.
176

178. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
UNDER
EXECUTIVE
ORDER
12,866
(1996),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html.
179. See DRIESEN, IS COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?, supra note 91, at 4 (“Some
health effects and most environmental effects cannot be quantified at all, because of large
data gaps.”).
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are two challenges in benefit measurement: quantifying the physical
impacts of rules on human health and environmental quality, and
quantifying the monetary value of the reductions in these impacts. For
example, mortality impacts from cancer or heart disease may be more
readily quantified than subtle forms of morbidity (e.g., neurological
effects) and related impacts on quality of life. Even if human health
impacts can be fully quantified, it may not be feasible to fully quantify the
physical impacts of a rule on natural resources, endangered species,
ecosystems and environmental quality. Once physical impacts are
quantified, a complete monetary expression of benefits may not be feasible
due to the lack of validated tools and data to express the public’s economic
demand for these benefits.
Unquantified benefits are a serious concern in regulatory analysis. In
Circular A-4, OMB’s most recent analytic guidance to agencies, agency
analysts are instructed to identify and consider non-quantified benefits and
costs:
It will not always be possible to express in monetary units all of the
important benefits and costs. When it is not, the most efficient alternative
will not necessarily be the one with the largest quantified and monetized
net benefit estimate. In such cases, you should exercise professional
judgment in determining how important the non-quantified benefits and
costs may be in the context of the overall analysis. 180

OMB also instructs agency analysts to include a summary table that lists
all of the unquantified benefits and costs.181 They are also urged to use
their professional judgment in highlighting the most important nonquantified or non-monetized impacts.182
Analysts in the European Commission are now taking even more
seriously the need to weight non-quantifiable benefits and costs by some
indication of their likely importance. 183 A categorical weighting scheme is
used to place anywhere from one dot to four dots on each unquantified
benefit and cost, representing the analyst’s view as to the likely importance
in the overall analysis. 184 It may be worthwhile for regulatory analysts in
the United States to consider a similar approach.

180. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 80, at 2.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. In October of 2005, the European Commission released a benefit-cost analysis of its
thematic clean air strategy. See AEA Technology, Cost Benefit Analysis of the Thematic
Strategy
on
Air
Pollution
(Oct.
2005),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/cafe/general/pdf/cba_thematic_strategy_0510.pdf.
184. See id.
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Distributional concerns

Some commentators are concerned that a pure benefit-cost analysis
may ignore crucial “distributional” matters that should be of concern to
policy makers. 185 OMB guidance, however, on regulatory-impact analysis
already encourages agencies to provide a meticulous accounting of a wide
range of distributional impacts including impacts on the environment,
impacts on children, impacts on small businesses, impacts on state and
local governments, impacts on the energy sector, and any transfers of
income or wealth that are expect to occur between segments of society. 186
Since the number of distributional impacts to be considered is potentially
infinite, relevant statutes and executive orders typically govern which
distributional impacts are analyzed.
vi.

The policy impacts of interagency review

Some commentators express concerns about the interagency reviews of
rulemakings sponsored by OMB, 187 in addition to the alleged biases in the

185. Ashford, supra note 158, at 130 (“Environmental regulation is not really an
instrument of economic policy; it is an instrument of social policy concerned with the nature
and distribution of the effects of industrial activity. Therefore, environmental regulation
cannot be judged by economic criteria alone.”).
186. OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, at 42-46.
187. Some are concerned that OMB review weakens rules. See DRIESEN, IS COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?, supra note 91, at 3 (“Opportunities [for OMB] to weaken a
rule before its submission may make it unnecessary to weaken it during the formal review
process.”). It is just as plausible, however, to argue that OMB review strengthens rules.
Some allege that OMB interferes with agency discretion by offering the agency a statutory
interpretation different from the one the agency initially proposed when it submitted a draft
rule for OMB review. See Lisa Heinzerling, Remarks at The Fordham Urban Law Journal
Symposium on the Contemporary Regulatory State (Feb. 23, 2006). It is also well
established, however, that the President is authorized to “‘supervise and guide’ Executive
Officers in ‘their construction of the statute under which they act in order to secure that
unitary and uniform execution of the laws which Article II of the Constitution evidently
contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone.’” Dep’t of
Justice/Office of Legal Counsel Opinion (Feb. 13, 1981) (quoting Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 135 (1936)). Some critics have urged courts to play a role in rules that have
been changed due to OMB input. See Olson, supra note 9, at 74-77 (stating that courts
should protect the agency’s statutory delegation of authority from OMB supervision and
require that OMB comments to the agency be docketed to preserve the agency’s
decisionmaking integrity”). Such litigation, however, is not likely to succeed. First, court
decisions have recognized the legality of executive regulatory review. Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983), rev’d on other grounds, 769 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, No. 85-1747, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13791, at *13 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 18, 1985) (providing that the dialogue between OMB and an agency during OMB’s
regulatory review “is entitled to deference even greater than that accorded intra-agency
deliberations”); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“The Court
recognizes the basic need of the President and his White House staff to monitor the
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analytics of benefit-cost analysis. If interagency review were neutral, they
argue, it would be just as likely to result in more stringent rules as less
stringent rules. 188 In reality, they argue, interagency review is not neutral
because it is much more likely to reduce (rather than increase)
the stringency of public health, safety, and environmental rules. 189 The
implication is that the interagency review process focuses only on ways to
reduce the costs of rules, without considering ways to increase benefits.
These commentators base their critique on a sample of rulemakings studied
by GAO 190 where the impact of interagency review was documented, as
well as on some anecdotal case studies of specific rules where information
on the impact of interagency review can be gleaned from the publicly
available information or deliberative information that has been
disclosed. 191 The assumption that underpins this critique, that agency
submissions of draft rules are just as likely to be insufficiently stringent as
overly stringent, has not been validated. In any event, a neutral interagency
review process—one faithful to both cost and benefit concerns—should
address these critiques.
Moreover, Professor John Mendeloff of the University of Pittsburgh, in
studies of risk regulation, has found that overregulation (defined as overly
stringent rules) tends to cause underregulation (insufficient breadth and

consistency of executive agency regulations with Administration policy.”); see also
Percival, supra note 8, at 197 (Questions about the legality (including constitutionality) of
OMB’s oversight in rulemaking have sparked considerable scholarly debate, although the
Sierra Club opinion is the clearest indication of the “legality and propriety of [White House]
regulatory review.”). Second, “courts are eager to avoid what the District of Columbia
Circuit has characterized as ‘difficult constitutional questions concerning the executive’s
proper role in administrative proceedings and the appropriate scope of delegated power from
Congress to certain executive agencies.’” Percival, supra note 8, at 167.
188. See DRIESEN, IS COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?, supra note 91, at 2 (stating that
OMB’s use of cost-benefit analysis under President George W. Bush “has been a tool often
used to weaken standards, and never used by OMB to make agency proposals stricter or
more extensive than what the agency was inclined to do on its own”).
189. Id. at 17; Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the
Bush Administration, Part II, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10485, 10488 (2004) [hereinafter
Heinzerling & Steinzor, A Perfect Storm, Part II] (“[C]ost-benefit analysis in the Bush
Administration has been a one-way street—used to justify delaying or weakening
regulation, not to strengthen it. When cost-benefit analysis almost certainly would justify
strengthening regulation, especially environmental regulation, OIRA has kept it holstered in
its belt.”).
190. GAO, 2003 REGULATORY REVIEW REPORT, supra note 73, at 69-102.
191. See HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS, supra note 131, at 17-20
(examining cost-benefit analysis as applied to EPA’s 2001 arsenic rule); see generally
Heinzerling & Steinzor, A Perfect Storm, Part I, supra note 87 (examining and criticizing
EPA’s mercury rule); Heinzerling & Steinzor, A Perfect Storm, Part II, supra note 189
(same).
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volume of rulemaking). 192 He argues that as the stringency of rules
increases, the resulting costs trigger more resistance—technical, political,
and legal—from the regulated community, forcing the regulatory agency to
invest more staffing, time, and legal resources in the completion of each
rulemaking. Mendeloff posits that a more moderate approach to stringency
based on benefit-cost considerations may permit a regulatory agency to
undertake more rulemakings than an approach that maximizes risk
reduction in each rulemaking, without regard to costs.
In the final analysis, what matters are the benefits and costs of the final
rules that are issued, not the various procedures and counter-pressures that
influence the final product. Since the evidence suggests that the “smart
regulation” approach to rulemaking—one with a combination of agency
and OIRA initiation, as well as interagency review—is inducing an
increase in net benefits compared to the Clinton Administration, there is no
particular reason to suggest that OIRA (and other interagency) review
activities should be curtailed or lessened.
OIRA’s role in facilitating strong federal regulations to protect public
health, safety, and the environment is already well documented in the
public record:
• In the first use of the “prompt” letter, OIRA encouraged the
Food and Drug Administration to finalize a rule initiated in the
Clinton Administration that requires the food industry to label
foods for trans-fat content. 193 Like saturated fat, a growing
body of scientific evidence links the trans-fat content of foods to
the development of coronary heart disease. FDA projects that
the new food-label requirement will stimulate almost $100 in
public health benefit for each one dollar in cost to industry and
consumers.
• In an unusual collaboration that began early in the rulemaking
process, OIRA worked with EPA on a new rule aimed at
reducing the amount of diesel exhaust from off-road engines
used in construction, mining and agriculture by ninety
percent. 194 By 2030, this rule’s net benefits are expected to be
$76 billion annually, with $78 billion in benefits and $2 billion
in costs (in 2000 dollars).

192. JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES REGULATION: HOW
OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA (1988).
193. Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrition Content Claims,
and Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,434 (July 11, 2003).
194. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69
Fed. Reg. 38,958 (June 29, 2004).
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•

OIRA also worked with EPA from the outset on a new rule
aimed at reducing the sulfur and nitrogen emissions from coalfired power-plants by seventy-percent.195 When fully
implemented in 2015, this rule’s net benefits are expected to be
$83.2 billion annually, with $86.3 billion in benefits and $3.1
billion in costs (in 1999 dollars). This rulemaking is among the
most important environmental policy initiatives in the Bush
Administration.
• OIRA chaired the interagency task force that assisted DOT in
two rulemakings related to the fuel economy of light trucks: the
first rulemaking raised fuel-economy standards for model years
2005 to 2007, 196 the first increases in almost a decade; the
second rulemaking reformed the structure of the program to
enhance safety while further increasing fuel-economy standards
for model years 2008 to 2011. 197 The more than eleven billion
gallons of fuel savings from these two rulemakings are projected
to be larger than any previous actions in the twenty-year history
of DOT’s fuel-economy program for light trucks.
These examples illustrate that OIRA is not reluctant to have a proregulatory impact when it is justified by sound science, engineering, and
economics.
IV. FUTURE CHALLENGES IN REGULATORY POLICY
While there is much encouraging news to report, serious challenges
remain.
A.

Homeland Security

The issue of homeland security will likely remain a central concern for
many years to come. While each passing day takes us farther away from
the September 11 (“9/11”) terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, these horrible acts
remain in the forefront of our memories as attacks continue elsewhere, and
our government discovers evidence and thwarts potential threats.
The 9/11 attacks revealed a regulatory issue that we must work to solve.
While homeland security regulations accounted for approximately half of

195. Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air
Interstate Rule), 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005).
196. Light Truck Average Fuel Economy Standards Model Years 2005-2007, 68 Fed.
Reg. 16,868 (Apr. 7, 2003).
197. Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011, 71
Fed. Reg. 17,566 (Apr. 6, 2006).
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the federal government’s major-rule costs in 2004, there is not yet a
feasible way to quantify benefits fully. How do we identify a potential
target and determine the probability of an attack, 198 the benefit achieved by
avoiding the damages associated with an attack, and the effectiveness of
the various countermeasures in reducing risk?
In its rule adopting security procedures for and allowing transient
operations at three Maryland airports near Washington, D.C., the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) examined the costs and benefits of the
regulation. 199 While providing detailed compliance costs, TSA’s benefits
data was more limited; nonetheless, TSA concluded that the benefits of the
rule would “vastly” exceed the costs:
[T]he primary benefit of the rule will be enhanced protection for a
significant number of vital government assets in the National Capital
Region, while keeping airports operational. . . . The security provisions
contained in this rule are an integral part of the effort to identify and
defeat the threat posed by members of foreign terrorist groups to vital
U.S. assets and security. The TSA believes that the rule will reduce the
risk that an airborne strike initiated from an airport moments away from
vital national assets will occur. The TSA recognizes that such an impact
may not cause substantial damage to property or a large structure;
however, it could potentially result in an undetermined number of
fatalities and injuries and reduced tourism. The resulting tragedy would
adversely impact the regional economies. 200

Similarly, in its proposed rule for flight restrictions in the Washington,
D.C. Area, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) acknowledged that
the cost of an act of terrorism “is extremely difficult to quantify” and can
include direct and indirect costs that are very high. 201 Developing a
methodology for estimating the benefits of avoiding a terrorist attack will
198. The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has embraced a risk-based
approach for addressing threats to this nation. See Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Dep’t
of Homeland Security, Address at the George Washington University Homeland Security
Policy
Institute
(Mar.
16,
2005),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4391; Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the
Dep’t of Homeland Security, Address, Second Stage Review Remarks (July 13, 2005),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4597; Department of Homeland
Security, Fact Sheet: Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructure—Chemical Security (June
15, 2005), http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4543.
199. Maryland Three Airports: Enhanced Security Procedures for Operations at Certain
Airports in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone, 70 Fed. Reg.
7150 (Feb. 10, 2005).
200. Id.
201. Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 70 Fed. Reg.
45,250 (Aug. 4, 2005).
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be a difficult but necessary task.
As we implement regulations designed to increase security to protect
lives and essential structures, we will also need to balance national security
and privacy needs with the public’s right to know about the burdens
imposed on them by these rules. As OMB explained in its 2003 Report to
Congress:
Admittedly, it may be difficult for a regulatory agency to evaluate in
specific instances the extent of the costs that a regulatory alternative
would likely impose. In emergency situations, for example, an agency
may not have much time to consider the various alternatives, much less
the time to perform a full evaluation of their respective benefits and costs,
before the agency must decide on a course of action. In such cases,
agencies should conduct as much analysis as the situation permits. In
addition, as commenters pointed out, it may be difficult for an agency to
express the cost in quantifiable, as opposed to qualitative, terms.
However, to the extent that an agency can quantify the regulatory impact,
the agency should attempt to do so (e.g., by indicating the number of
persons that would likely be affected by the regulation). This additional
analysis is helpful in providing as complete a picture as possible of the
implications and justification for the proposed regulatory approach. 202

In the same report, OMB also emphasized that the same tools of benefitcost analysis that are used in other regulatory contexts can—and should—
be applied as well in the evaluation of homeland security rules:
Developing Federal regulations involves a series of steps: identifying the
nature and extent of the problem; determining whether Federal action is
needed or desirable; if it is determined that Federal action is needed or
desirable, identifying the relevant legal authorities and the policy options;
then evaluating those options based on their “pros” and “cons,” which
includes an identification and consideration of the anticipated benefits and
costs associated with each option; and, finally, concluding with a decision
on which course of action to pursue.
Homeland security regulations raise new issues and pose new challenges
for Federal agencies. However, the same general framework should apply
to the development of homeland security regulations as agencies have
applied over the years in their development of other types of regulations.
Federal agencies that address homeland security matters need to go
through the same general steps in deciding whether Federal action is
needed and desirable and, if so, in determining what course of action to

202. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, INFORMING REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2003 REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 85 (2003) [hereinafter OMB, 2003
REPORT TO CONGRESS].
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pursue. In this regard, these agencies can and should, to the extent
possible, use the standard tools of regulatory analysis that have been
developed over the years to inform decision makers about the anticipated
benefits and costs of the various policy options that they are
considering. 203

B.

The Sea of Existing Regulations

Another challenge faced not only by the newly-created DHS, which
inherited many longstanding agencies with robust regulatory programs,204
but also by most other federal departments, is the sea of existing
regulations.
Notwithstanding its limited resources, OIRA has undertaken modest
efforts to address the old regulations and to determine if they are necessary.
In 2001, OMB solicited public nominations of existing rules that should be
modified or rescinded. 205 OMB received seventy-one nominations and
designated twenty-three as “high priority.” 206 The agencies with the largest
number of nominations were the Department of Labor and EPA. 207 By
December 2004, federal agencies had addressed most of the twenty-three
priority nominations, as well as some of the lower-priority nominations.
Most of the reforms were implemented by agencies without any need for
legislative action. 208
In 2002, OMB again solicited reform nominations after a significant
outreach effort with the regulated communities.209 The scope of eligible
reforms was expanded to include guidance documents as well as rules.210
OMB received 316 distinct nominations, a much larger number than it
could evaluate in a priority-setting process. 211 After referral to the agencies
for evaluation, over one hundred of them were identified by the agencies as
worthy of further evaluation and action. Many of these one hundred are in
the process of being reformed by agencies. 212

203. Id. at 85-86.
204. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is comprised of various agencies
formerly associated with other departments including the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (CBP); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); TSA; and the U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG).
205. OMB, 2001 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 77, at 61-134.
206. Id. at 61-62.
207. Id. at 62.
208. OMB, 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 102, at 150-204.
209. OMB, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 73, at 75-85.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. OMB, 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 202, at 21-30.
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In 2004, OMB chose to target the manufacturing sector of the U.S.
economy for reform because economic studies indicate that this sector
bears a disproportionate share of regulatory burden.213 Of the 189 reform
nominations received, OMB worked with federal agencies to identify
seventy-six that justified priority review and response. 214 In its final 2005
Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation, OMB
documented agency progress in meeting deadlines for activity on these
seventy-six priority reforms. 215
Although the number of reforms being pursued by OMB and the
agencies in the 2001-2005 period is small compared to the total number of
rules on the books, this amount of simplification work is stretching the
resources available to both federal agencies and OMB. While some of the
reforms have been controversial in Congress (e.g., the streamlining of New
Source Review procedures under the Clean Air Act and modernization of
overtime regulations in the workplace), none of the reforms have been
overturned by legislation or appropriations measures in the Congress.
C.

Collaboration with European Union Regulators

Since U.S. and European rules tend to have a huge influence around the
world, it is especially important that the United States and the European
Union (E.U.) collaborate on regulatory matters. Their track record in this
regard, however, is mixed.
The inability of these two major economic powers to proceed
collaboratively can lead to outcomes that are very difficult to explain. For
example, the two sides of the Atlantic cannot agree on the proper design of
the crash dummies that are used in automobile crash tests. That means that
vehicle manufacturers doing business both in the U.S. and in Europe face
the prospect of undertaking separate crash tests using American and
European dummies. Actually, the difference between the two crash tests is
not limited to the design of the crash test dummies. In addition, the
European dummy wears safety belts but the American dummy does not.
All the news, however, is not bleak. The quality of dialogue between the
European Union and the Bush Administration is improving on a wide range
of issues. In September of 2005, OMB hosted a three-day visit by twelve

213. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY REFORM OF THE U.S.
MANUFACTURING
SECTOR
1-66
(2005),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/reports/manufacturing_initiative.pdf.
214. Id.
215. OMB, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 117-25.
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senior career officials from the European Commission (E.C.).216 The
meeting participants compared notes on how the regulatory systems are
evolving and how regulatory analysis is done in each system. In January of
2006, the E.C. hosted a meeting with OMB and agency personnel in
Brussels, Belgium where information on the technical and institutional
aspects of regulatory analysis in the U.S. and the E.U. was shared. 217 The
E.C. has become quite serious about regulatory reform. The U.S. and E.C.
agree that better regulation is a key to more jobs and prosperity. 218 Both
sides are determined to make more tangible progress on the challenge of
regulatory collaboration, which will result in gains for both the American
and European economies.
V.

CONCLUSION

During the 2001-2006 period, OIRA led a government-wide effort
to tighten benefit-cost scrutiny of new unfunded mandates, streamline or
modernize about 100 existing regulations, and enhance the quality of
scientific information and analysis used and disseminated by the federal
government. It is too early to assess the long-term impacts of this effort on
the quality of regulation and governmental information. However, the
early indications are that the effort has slowed the growth of costly new
federal rules (compared to previous Administrations) while permitting—
and indeed encouraging—rules with benefits that justify their costs. As a
result, the benefit-cost performance of federal regulators has improved.
The future challenges that remain in regulatory policy are considerable.
The sea of existing federal regulations needs to be rationalized. A more
systematic process for developing and reviewing homeland security rules
needs to be established. Finally, the United States and the European Union
need to do a better job of coordinating their regulatory programs.

216

Meeting Agenda, U.S.-E.U. Dialogue on Regulatory Reform (Sept. 28-30,
2005), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/World_Regions/Europe_Middle_East/Europe/US_EU_
Regulatory_Cooperation/asset_upload_file32_9163.pdf.
217
Meeting Agenda, E.U.-U.S. Conference on Good Regulatory Practices,
Brussels, (Jan. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/World_Regions/Europe_Middle_East/Europe/US_EU_
Regulatory_Cooperation/asset_upload_file229_9166.pdf.
218. See Fact Sheet: U.S.—E.U. Summit: Continuing Our Cooperation to Expand
Transatlantic
Trade
(May
7,
2001),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040626-12.html.

